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1 Introduction
In this paper, we explain how learning about long-term profitability impacts corporate cash
management. While the trade-off between the costs and benefits of holding cash has received
much attention in recent literature, little is known on the dynamics of this trade-off in
a setting where long-term profitability is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, this issue is
key for corporations that do not fully know their long-term prospects and face important
external financing constraints. This is notably the case for young firms conducting intensive
research and development (R&D) and innovative activities, as documented in the literature.1
For those firms, information problems and lack of collateral value of intangible assets make
external capital very costly. This leads them to finance their activities with internal cash
flow and to issue stock when cash flow is exhausted, as pointed out in Brown, Fazzari and
Petersen (2009).2 Learning about profitability is key because better profitability prospects
facilitate access to the market.3
These observations raise the more general issue of corporate cash policy in an incomplete
information setting and echo the so-called corporate life-cycle theory, which develops the
idea that the trade-off between the advantages and costs of cash retention evolve with prof-
itability prospects. Corporate life-cycle theory has proven empirically relevant in explaining
firms’ payout practices and the dynamics and valuation of cash holdings.4 In short, young
firms tend to hold more cash and pay little in dividends because they are afraid of losing a
potentially profitable project due to their limited access to external resources. Mature firms
with proven profitability are more likely to pay dividends and have better access to capital
markets. In this view, cash is built up to cover investment needs that the capital markets
1See, e.g., Hall and Lerner (2010) and Kerr and Nanda (2015) for surveys on the financing of innovation
and the role of learning in running innovative projects.
2Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) find evidence that young, high-tech firms almost entirely financed
by cash flow or public share issues explain most of the 1994 to 2004 aggregate R&D cycle. More recently,
Graham and Leary (2018) find evidence that a large number of new public Nasdaq firms from 1980 to 2000
were holding large amounts of cash. They find that this effect was most pronounced among unprofitable,
largely debt-free, high-growth, and high-volatility firms operating in the health care or high-tech industries.
3A striking textbook case is the funding crisis Intel faced in the early 1980s, as documented in Passov
(2003). At that time, the large potential of microprocessors was difficult to realize, which is a main reason
external financing was extremely costly for Intel.
4See, for instance, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), who test the life-cycle theory of dividends, and
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010), who study the determinants of seasoned equity offerings and the
relation to the corporate life cycle. See also Drobetz, Halling and Schroder (2015), who use the Dickinson
(2011) methodology to relate the dynamics of corporate cash to the corporate life cycle.
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would not be willing to finance and is less critical when the firm becomes mature.
The theoretical literature on corporate cash, despite the many achievements discussed
below, does not capture these stylized facts. This is because, with few exceptions, exist-
ing models focus on liquidity issues in a complete information setting and typically remain
silent on the intertwining between holding cash and learning about profitability. Our pa-
per aims to close this gap. We develop a stylized continuous-time model of an all-equity
firm confronted with three frictions: imperfect information about long-term profitability,
external financing costs and costs of holding cash. Shareholders are cash constrained and
do not know the actual long-term profitability of the firm’s project. They observe at any
time realized earnings and infer the profitability prospects from a Bayesian estimation of
the firm’s long-term profitability. They also control the dynamics of cash through issuance
and payment policies, thereby weighing the costs and benefits of holding cash. In such a
framework, shareholders must cope with both a profitability concern (the risk of running
a project that is not profitable) and a liquidity concern (the risk of having to liquidate a
profitable project). Formally, we solve a new two-dimensional optimization problem where
the state variables are the controlled cash reserves and the profitability prospects. The prob-
lem is highly nontrivial. Intuitively, a positive shock to earnings increases the profitability
prospects. This should facilitate external financing and induce the firm’s management to
lower cash target levels. Nevertheless, a firm has more to lose from liquidity constraints
when profitability prospects are high than it does when they are low. This may induce
the firm’s management to accumulate more cash when the profitability prospects increase.
We spell out all these interactions and show that they result in two life-cycle stages for the
firm: a “probation stage” in which the firm has no access and a “mature stage” in which
the firm does have access to capital markets. We provide a stylized theoretical model where
the corporate life-cycle dynamics of cash holdings stem from the optimal equity issuance,
payout and liquidation policies that we derive explicitly. A rich set of implications follows.
We highlight our primary findings here.
Issuance occurs when cash reserves are depleted if and only if profitability prospects are
larger than an endogenous threshold that corresponds to the minimal level of profitability
prospects required to access the capital markets. Above that threshold, the firm is in the
mature stage and can issue new shares whenever needed. Below that threshold, the firm
is in the probation stage, cannot tap the market and is liquidated when cash is exhausted.
Therefore, in our study, the terms “probation stage” and “mature stage” do not refer to
the age of the firm but rather to its ability to finance its activity with new share issues. In
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particular, the firm can go back and forth between the two stages.
The uncertainty about the firm’s actual profitability impacts the corporate cash policy,
which, in terms of cash target levels, changes as the firm learns about its long-term prof-
itability. We establish that a continuous function of the profitability prospects, the dividend
boundary function, characterizes the cash target levels. We show that when cash reserves
reach the dividend boundary function, shareholders pay out as dividends a fraction of the
cash above the dividend boundary and reinvest the complement into the firm. The frac-
tion that shareholders reinvest into the firm is also a function of the profitability prospects,
the so-called corporate propensity to save. Our theoretical analysis yields dynamics of cash
holdings that are drastically different in the two different regimes of the corporate life cycle.
Salient results are as follows.
• In the probation stage, the precautionary motive for holding cash is strong because
the firm has no access to the market. The model predicts that the dividend boundary
function is increasing in the profitability prospects and that the corporate propensity
to save is decreasing. The corporate propensity to save takes large positive values,
which means that the firm pays little in dividends. The firm reaches its maximum
cash target level on the edge between the two regimes.
• Shareholders of a firm entering into the mature stage have built a large amount of
cash reserves and have increased profitability prospects. They optimally decide to
initiate dividend payments. This causes a discontinuity in the corporate propensity to
save, which becomes negative, meaning that the firm dissaves and uses its reserves to
pay more dividends than its last profit. The corporate propensity to save is negative
and increasing and tends toward 0 as profitability prospects increase. The dividend
boundary function is decreasing in the profitability prospects and tends toward a cash
target level that prevails in the complete information benchmark of our model.
• The profitability prospects required to enter the market, as well as the cash target
levels, increase with the cost of external financing. As a result, the model predicts that
a high-cost firm dissaves more aggressively when it becomes mature.
All these results are unique to our model and are grounded in a mathematical contribution
to the literature on stochastic control: we analytically solve a two-dimensional Bayesian
adaptive singular control problem. We prove that the associated free boundary function (our
dividend boundary function) is defined as the solution to an ordinary differential equation.
The free boundary function is nonmonotonic and attains its maximum at a point where it is
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nondifferentiable. We show that the corporate propensity to save is related to the derivative
of the dividend boundary function. It follows that the corporate propensity to save features
a discontinuity when the cash target level reaches its maximum, as we emphasized in the
previous paragraph.
Additional economic insights follow from the model analysis. We find that a single
indicator, defined as the firm performance, characterizes the two stages of the corporate
life cycle. The firm’s performance reflects payments to shareholders, the issuance proceeds
and the ex ante prior beliefs on the firm’s long-term profitability. The performance of the
firm remains unchanged as long as the firm neither pays dividends nor issues new securities.
It increases whenever the firm reaches a cash target level and decreases whenever the firm
issues new shares. The initial assessment of the firm’s long-term profitability (for example,
by specialized intermediaries for the financing of innovation) has lasting effects and matters
for evaluating the performance of the firm at any date. We find that the firm has access to
the capital markets if and only if its performance is above an endogenous threshold.
We show that for a fixed level of performance, the firm value can be described as a function
of its cash reserves. That function is increasing and convex for a fixed performance level
sufficiently below the required performance to access the market, while it is increasing and
concave for a fixed performance level sufficiently above the required performance to access
the market. The value of the firm as a function of its cash reserves is neither convex nor
concave for fixed levels of performance close to the market access threshold. These properties
are unique to our model. Intuitively, in the probation stage, profitability is an important
issue. One more unit of profitability prospects has a larger impact on the value of the firm
than one more unit of cash. The opposite occurs in the mature stage. This yields the above
concavity/convexity properties. A series of novel implications follow regarding the dynamics
of the value of the firm, especially about the relationship between the volatility of the firm
and its value. Our model predicts a positive relationship between the volatility of the firm
and its value when the firm is far from accessing to the market and a negative relationship
between firm value and volatility when the firm has proven access to the market. Close to
the market access threshold, the volatility of the firm is an inverted U-shaped function of
the value of the firm. Overall, our model suggests that most changes in the features of a
firm’s key indicators (volatility, cash target levels, payout ratios) occur at transition phases
between life-cycle stages.
Relationship to the literature. Our paper belongs to the growing theoretical literature on
corporate cash management. In the simplest models, the cumulative net cash flow generated
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by the firm follows an arithmetic Brownian motion. The constant drift represents the firm’s
profitability per unit of time, and the Brownian shock is interpreted as a liquidity shock.
External financing is costly, which creates a precautionary demand for cash. Agency costs of
free cash flow create a cost of carrying cash. This results in a unique optimal payout policy
that requires paying shareholders 100% of earnings beyond an endogenous constant cash
target level (the corporate propensity to save at the cash target level is zero). Pioneering
studies include Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995), Radner and Shepp (1996) and Kim, Mauer
and Sherman (1998).5 These contributions have been extended in a number of directions.
For instance, De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (DMRV) (2011) study the interac-
tion between cash management, agency costs, issuance costs and stock price; Bolton, Cheng
and Wang (2011) extend the model to the case of flexible firm size in order to study the dy-
namic patterns of corporate investment; and Bolton, Chen and Wang (2013) and Hugonnier,
Malamud and Morellec (2014) introduce capital supply uncertainty and the necessary time
needed to secure outside funds into the analysis. De´camps, Gryglewicz, Morellec and Vil-
leneuve (2017) assume that the firm’s operating cash flow is proportional to profitability, the
dynamics of which are governed by a geometric Brownian motion. The ratio of cash holdings
to profitability is the state variable of the firm’s problem. This leads to a dividend boundary
function that is linear in profitability. Malamud and Zucchi (2018) develop a model of en-
dogenous growth where firms face costly access to financial markets and hoard cash reserves
to sustain innovation. Closer to our study, Bolton, Wang and Yang (BWY) (2019) develop
a two-dimensional real option model with financial constraints. The state variables are the
earnings which follow a geometric Brownian motion process, and the controlled cash reserve
process. Investment decisions in growth options characterize the different phase of the firm’s
life-cycle. BWY (2019) study the interaction between optimal timing of real options and
corporate cash management. We study the interaction between learning about profitability
and corporate cash management.
Our study is naturally related to the corporate finance literature that emphasizes the
role of learning about profitability and its importance for corporate decision-making. Pastor
and Veronesi (2003) study stock prices in a model in which shareholders of an all-equity firm
learn about profitability over time. Their model avoids both the liquidity and liquidation
issues, assuming a peculiar dividend strategy that maintains a positive book value of the
firm’s equity at any time. In Moyen and Platinakov (2013), shareholders update their beliefs
5Influential empirical papers driving the theory are Opler, Pinkowitz and Stulz (1999) and Bates, Kahle
and Stulz (2009).
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about firms’ quality (high or low) in a dynamic Tobin’s q framework. They find evidence that
firms with unclear quality are more sensitive to earnings in their investment decisions than
are well-established firms. In these models, cash-constrained firms become well established
as time passes by learning about their profitability. Unlike in our model, cash management
plays no role in these models. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2017) study a dynamic contracting
model with learning about the profitability of the firm. In their model, asymmetric infor-
mation arises endogenously because by shirking, an entrepreneur can distort the beliefs of
investors about the project’s profitability. The paper studies the relationship between incen-
tives and learning. Our focus is different. We do not model hidden actions. In our model,
information is incomplete but symmetric between stakeholders. We study the interplay be-
tween the evolution of profitability prospects and the evolution of the trade-off between the
cost and benefit of holding cash. Our learning technology is also different. We borrow it
from Decamps, Mariotti and Villeneuve (2005), who study the optimal decision to invest
in a project whose profitability is not perfectly known. There are no financial constraints
in their setting, so payout policies and issuance policies are irrelevant. Our paper is closely
related to Gryglewicz (2011), who also considers a model in which the profitability per unit
of time is a random variable, the value of which shareholders learn over time. There are no
frictions inside the firm, so holding cash is not costly. It follows that any dividend policy
that maintains the reserves above a critical level is optimal. Gryglewicz (2011) studies how
this framework impacts the optimal capital structure that results from the trade-off between
tax shields and bankruptcy costs. In our study, holding cash and issuing new shares are
costly.6 The payout and issuance policies are uniquely defined.
The paper is organized as follows. We lay out the model in Section 2. Section 3 studies
benchmarks in which shareholders face profitability and liquidity concerns separately. Sec-
tion 4 solves the model in a closed form and presents the optimal corporate policies. Section
5 develops the model implications. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Learning
A firm has a single investment project that generates random cash flows over time. The cu-
mulative cash flow process {Rt; t ≥ 0} follows an arithmetic Brownian motion with unknown
6In Gryglewicz (2011), equity financing is costless beyond t = 0, as is often the case in contingent claim
models.
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drift Y and known variance σ
dRt = Y dt+ σ dWt, t ≥ 0,
where {Wt; t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion independent of Y .7
The firm is held by risk-neutral shareholders who do not fully know the project’s long-
term profitability Y but observe the cumulative cash flow process {Rt; t ≥ 0}. The project’s
profitability Y takes either of the two values −µ < 0 < µ. The conditional expectation
Yt = E[Y | FRt ], (1)
defines the profitability prospects at time t. In (1), {FRt ; t ≥ 0} denotes the filtration
generated by {Rt; t ≥ 0} that models the flow of information available to shareholders. The
process {Yt; t ≥ 0} satisfies the filtering equation8
dYt =
1
σ
(µ2 − Y 2t )dBt, (2)
where the so-called innovation process {Bt; t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion with
respect to the filtration {FRt ; t ≥ 0} and satisfies
dBt =
1
σ
(dRt − Ytdt). (3)
The cumulative cash flow process is a sufficient statistic for Bayesian updating. Specifically,
a direct application of Itoˆ’s formula yields the relation
dRt = dφ(Yt), (4)
where the function φ(y) =
σ2
2µ
ln
(
µ+ y
µ− y
)
is increasing and defined on (−µ, µ). Finally, we
obtain from (3) that
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs dRs
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rsYs ds
]
≤ µ
r
.
Therefore, the present value of the future cash flows is lower than the present value of future
cash flows of a project with observed long-term profitability µ.
7Technically, the process {Wt; t ≥ 0} and the random variable Y are defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F , {Ft},P) with filtration {Ft; t ≥ 0} satisfying the usual condition of right continuity and completion
by P-negligible sets.
8See, for instance, Liptser and Shiryaev (1977).
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2.2 The shareholders’ problem
Risk-neutral shareholders discount future payments at the risk-free interest rate r > 0 and
must keep positive liquid reserves at all times if they want to avoid liquidation. The model
builds on the standard cost versus benefit trade-off of holding cash. The firm accumulates
cash for precautionary motives in a costly external financing environment. We allow the
firm to increase its cash holdings or cover operating losses by raising funds in the capital
markets. External financing involves a proportional cost p > 1: for each dollar of new shares
issued, the firm only receives 1/p dollars in cash, where p − 1 > 0 represents the marginal
issuance cost. Carrying cash is costly. Because of internal frictions, the rate of return of cash
inside the firm is lower than the cost of capital. To capture in a simple and tractable way
the agency costs of free cash flow, we consider that the cost per unit of time of holding one
dollar of cash inside the firm corresponds to the cost of capital r dt. Shareholders can reduce
these costs by deciding to distribute cash.9 In addition to this trade-off, shareholders are
not aware of the profitability, positive or negative, of the firm’s project. Thus, shareholders
face both a profitability concern (the risk of running a project that is not profitable) and a
liquidity concern (the risk of having to liquidate a profitable project).
Formally, at each date, shareholders decide whether to continue the project, whether
to distribute dividends and whether to issue new shares. For simplicity, we assume that
the liquidation value of the project is equal to 0. The cumulative cash reserve process
X = {Xt; t ≥ 0} evolves according to the dynamics
dXt = dRt +
dIt
p
− dDt, (5)
where D = {Dt; t ≥ 0} and I = {It; t ≥ 0} are nondecreasing processes that denote the
cumulative dividend and the cumulative issuance processes.10 Thus, dXt, the cash reserves
at time t, corresponds to the operating cash flow dRt plus the cash flow from financing
activities
dIt
p
− dDt, that is, the cash received from issuing securities minus the cash paid
as dividends.
9These modeling assumptions are standard in corporate cash models. Agency costs of free cash flow can
be notably important in the innovation sector due, for instance, to moral hazard between the inventor and
financiers. See, e.g., Allen and Michaely (2003), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008), and Hall and
Lerner (2010) for insightful surveys of the literature.
10Technically, (I,D) belongs to the set A of admissible policies: I and D are FR-adapted, right-continuous,
and nondecreasing with I0 = D0 = 0, and the associated cash reserves {Xt,FRt ; t ≥ 0} satisfy Xt ≥
0, e−rtXt integrable and, limt→∞ E[e−rtXt] = 0. Note that D is nondecreasing, so shareholders’ limited
liability is satisfied. In our setting, dividends can be distributed at no cost, and we do not need to allow
share repurchases; thus, I is nondecreasing.
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Using (4), we rewrite (5) in the form
Xt = φ(Yt)− φ(Y0) +X0 + It
p
−Dt. (6)
Equation (6) is an accounting identity that specifies the relationships between cash reserves,
profitability prospects, cumulative issuance and cumulative dividends. Observe that since φ
is an increasing function, by holding the cash reserves Xt fixed and the cumulative issuance
It fixed, the higher the cumulative dividend Dt is, the larger the profitability prospects
Yt. Thus, Equation (5) shows a positive relationship between cumulative dividend and
profitability prospects, all else being equal. Similarly, there is a negative relationship between
the cumulative issuance and the profitability prospects, all else being equal. Additionally,
by holding the cumulative dividend and the cumulative issuance fixed, there is a one-to-one
relationship between the cash reserves and the profitability prospects.
The firm ceases its activity for two possible reasons: (i) the firm cannot meet its short-
term operating costs by issuing new shares or by drawing cash from its reserves, and/or
(ii) shareholders strategically decide to liquidate because the profitability prospects are not
high enough. Thus, equation (5) represents the dynamics of the cash reserves up to the
liquidation time τ0 defined as
τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt = 0}.
Given an admissible dividend policy (I,D) ∈ A, current cash reserves x ∈ [0,∞) and
current profitability prospects y ∈ (−µ, µ), the value of the firm corresponds to the expected
present value of all future dividends minus the expected present value of all future gross
issuance proceeds
V (x, y; I,D) = E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt(dDt − dIt)
]
, (7)
with Dτ0 −Dτ−0 = max(Xτ−0 , 0). The case Dτ0 −Dτ−0 = Xτ−0 > 0 corresponds to a strategic
liquidation.11 The shareholders’ problem is to find the optimal value function defined as the
supremum of (7) over all admissible issuance and dividend policies
V ∗(x, y) = sup
(I,D)∈A
V (x, y; I,D). (8)
3 Benchmarks
Two polar cases are worth mentioning: (i) the case where shareholders face only a profitabil-
ity concern and (ii) the case where the shareholders face only a liquidity concern. These
11In that case, shareholders take the remaining cash reserves Xτ−0
> 0 as dividends.
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benchmarks provide natural bounds to the value of the firm V ∗.
3.1 First-best benchmark
Let us assume that shareholders can issue and repurchase shares at no cost whenever they
want. That is, we assume that p = 1 in (5). In this framework, shareholders face only a
profitability concern. Accumulating cash does not bring any benefit, while carrying cash is
costly. Intuitively, an optimal policy is to distribute all of the firm’s initial cash reserves x
as a special payment at date 0, to hold no cash beyond that time, and to liquidate when the
profitability prospects are too low. In this first-best environment, the firm’s value Vˆ is equal
to the sum of current cash reserves plus the option value to liquidate the firm12:
Vˆ (x, y) ≡ x+ sup
τ∈T R
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsYsds
]
. (9)
The firm is optimally liquidated when the firm’s profitability prospects hit the so-called first
best liquidation threshold y∗, which can be explicitly computed. Formally, the stopping time
τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 |Yt = y∗} is optimal for problem (9). The mapping y −→ Vˆ (x, y) − x is an
increasing and convex function over (−µ, µ). It corresponds to the option value to liquidate
the firm.
The logic of Miller and Modigliani (1961) applies, and there is a large degree of freedom
in designing the cumulative issuance and dividend processes that deliver the value (9). To
see this, consider the payout policy Dˆt = (x1 t=0 + lt)1 t≤τ∗ . That is, the firm distributes all
its cash reserves at time 0 and pays a constant dividend flow l > 0 up to the stopping time τ ∗,
which corresponds to the date at which shareholders strategically decide to liquidate. To keep
cash reserves constant and equal to zero after time 0, shareholders issue or repurchase new
shares to offset earnings up to the liquidation date τ ∗, that is, Iˆt = ((Yt− l)dt+ σdBt)1 t≤τ∗ .
Thus, we have
Vˆ (x, y) = E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rt(dDˆt − dIˆt)
]
= x+ sup
τ∈T R
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsYsds
]
.
To summarize,
Proposition 1 Suppose that shareholders face only a profitability concern. Then, the fol-
lowing holds:
(i) The value of the firm, Vˆ (x, y), is an increasing and convex function of the level y of
the profitability prospects.
12In (9), we denote by T R the set of FR-stopping times.
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(ii) Distributing all initial cash reserves x at time 0, holding no cash beyond that time, and
liquidating at the stopping time τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt = y∗} are an optimal policy.
There are many degrees of freedom in designing the dividend policy.
Finally, the shareholders’ value function V ∗ in (8) is bounded above by the benchmark
Vˆ .
Corollary 1 The value functions V ∗ and Vˆ satisfy V ∗(x, y) ≤ Vˆ (x, y) for any (x, y) ∈
[0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
In particular, if the profitability prospects are lower than the first-best liquidation threshold
y∗, then the firm is liquidated regardless of the amount of cash within the firm. Formally,
V ∗(x, y) = Vˆ (x, y) = x for all x ≥ 0 and y ≤ y∗.
3.2 Complete information benchmark
Another useful benchmark is the complete information setting in which shareholders face
only a liquidity concern. This corresponds to the case where y = −µ or y = µ in the main
problem (8).13 We shall denote by V−µ(x) and Vµ(x) the associated values of the firm.
When y = −µ, the firm’s profitability is negative, and it is optimal for shareholders
to take the initial cash reserves and to liquidate the firm at time t = 0. We have that
V−µ(x) = x, ∀x ≥ 0.
When y = µ, the dynamics of the cash reserve process take the form
dXt = µ dt+ σ dWt +
dIt
p
− dDt.
and we revert to a classic case studied by many authors.14
Specifically, the value of the firm, Vµ(x), is an increasing and concave function of the
level x of its cash reserves. The marginal value of cash, V ′µ(x), is strictly greater than one
up to xµ = inf{x > 0 |V ′µ(x) = 1}. The threshold xµ corresponds to the firm’s cash target
level at which dividends are paid. If cash holdings x exceed xµ, the firm places no premium
on internal funds, and it is optimal to make a lump sum payment x − xµ to shareholders.
Accordingly, Vµ(x) = x− xµ + Vµ(xµ) for any x ≥ xµ.
Because external financing is costly, it is optimal to postpone the issuance of new shares
for as long as possible: equity issuance only takes place whenever cash reserves are depleted
13Technically, −µ and µ are absorbing barriers for the process Y : if y = µ (resp. y = −µ), then Yt = µ a.s
(resp. Yt = −µ a.s).
14See, for instance, the textbook by Moreno-Bromberg and Rochet (2018).
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and occurs if and only if the cost of issuance is not too high. Specifically, there exists a
threshold p such that there is equity issuance every time Xt = 0 if and only if p < p.
15 In
that case, the marginal benefit, V ′µ(0), is equal to the proportional issuance cost, p. Given
that the value of the firm is concave in x, one obtains V ′µ(x) ≤ p for x ≥ 0. This means that
it is indeed never optimal to issue new shares before cash reserves are depleted. Finally, the
optimal issuance strategy induces a reflection at level zero of the cash reserve process so that
infinitesimal amounts of new equity are issued every time Xt = 0.
The following proposition summarizes these standard results, first established in Lokka
and Zervos (2008) and then used and generalized in several studies, especially in DMRV
(2011) and Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011). We provide a complete and rigorous statement
in appendix A.
Proposition 2 Suppose that shareholders face only a liquidity concern, so y = µ. Then,
the value of the firm, Vµ(x), is an increasing and concave function of the level x of its cash
reserves. Any excess of cash over the dividend boundary xµ is paid out to shareholders.
Furthermore,
(i) If issuance costs are high such that p ≥ p, then it is never optimal to issue new equities,
and the firm is liquidated as soon as it runs out of cash.
(ii) If issuance costs are low such that p < p, then equity issuance takes place whenever the
firm runs out of cash, so that the cash reserve process is reflected back whenever it hits
0, and the firm is never liquidated.
The complete information case also provides a useful upper-bound to the shareholders’
value function V ∗.
Corollary 2 The value functions V ∗ and Vµ satisfy V ∗(x, y) ≤ Vµ(x) for any (x, y) ∈
[0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
The properties described in Proposition 2 are common to most of the recent models on
corporate cash management: the value of the firm decreases after dividend payments and at
dividend payment dates takes the constant value Vµ(xµ). At the cash target level, the firm
has no propensity to save cash whatever the level of the financing frictions. That is, 100% of
cash available for distribution is paid to shareholders. The value of the firm increases after
15The analysis yields that p = V
′
µ(0), where V µ corresponds to the value of the firm if issuance of new
shares is not allowed (see Appendix A).
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issuances and takes at issuance dates the constant value Vµ(0). Additionally, in this theory,
there are only two types of firms: firms that never default and firms that always default when
cash reserves are depleted. We show that imperfect information about long-term profitability
dramatically impacts all these results.
4 Model solution
The next section is heuristic and leads to a variational system that should satisfy the value
of the firm V ∗ solution to (8).
4.1 Heuristic discussion
Taking the cash reserve and liquidating is an admissible policy, thus the value function V ∗
satisfies the inequality V ∗(x, y) ≥ x for all (x, y) ∈ (0,∞) × (−µ, µ). From Corollary 1,
V ∗(x, y) = x for all y ≤ y∗, where y∗ is the first-best liquidation threshold. To proceed
further, we assume in this section that V ∗ is as smooth as necessary, and we derive some
properties that V ∗ should satisfy.16
Dynamic programming. Let us fix some pair (x, y) ∈ (0,∞) × (−µ, µ). Let us consider
the policy that consists of abstaining from issuing new shares and paying dividends for t∧ τ0
units of time and, then, in applying the optimal policy associated with the resulting couple
(x+
∫ t∧τ0
0
Ys ds+ σdBs, y +
∫ t∧τ0
0
1
σ
(µ2 − Y 2s )dBs), implied by dynamics (2) and (3). This
policy must yield no more than the optimal policy:
0 ≥ E
[
e−r(t∧τ0)V ∗
(
x+
∫ t∧τ0
0
Ys ds+ σdBs, y +
∫ t∧τ0
0
1
σ
(µ2 − Y 2s )dBs
)]
−V ∗(x, y)
= E
[∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs (LV ∗(Xs, Ys)− rV ∗(Xs, Ys)) ds
]
. (10)
The last equality follows from Itoˆ’s formula, where L denotes the partial differential operator
defined by
LV ∗(x, y) = 1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2V ∗yy +
1
2
σ2V ∗xx + (µ
2 − y2)V ∗xy + yV ∗x .
Letting t go to zero in (10) yields
LV ∗(x, y)− rV ∗(x, y) ≤ 0
16We prove in the appendix all the regularity properties required to justify our model.
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for all (x, y) ∈ (0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
Dividend boundary. The intuition that underlies the complete information benchmark
applies: fix some (x, y) ∈ (0,∞) × (−µ, µ); the policy that consists of making a payment
ε ∈ (0, x), and then immediately executing the optimal policy associated with cash reserves
x− ε must yield no more than the optimal policy. That is,
V ∗(x, y) ≥ V ∗(x− ε, y) + ε.
Subtracting V ∗(x− ε, y) from both sides of this inequality, dividing through by ε and letting
ε approach 0 yield
V ∗x (x, y) ≥ 1
for all (x, y) ∈ (0,∞)× (−µ, µ). It is expected that the inequality V ∗x (x, y) > 1 holds for any
x ∈ (0, b∗(y)), where b∗(y) = inf{x, V ∗x (x, y) = 1} > 0. Intuitively, for any fixed profitability
prospects y, any excess of cash above b∗(y) should be paid out. Therefore, the optimal cash
policy should not be characterized by a constant threshold, as in the previous literature, but
rather by a dividend boundary function y −→ b∗(y).
Issuance policy. If it is never optimal to issue new shares when the firm’s profitability
is known and equal to µ, then it should also never be optimal to issue new shares in the
incomplete information setting. Thus, if p ≥ p, we expect that there are no equity issuances
at all, so the firm is liquidated when it runs out of cash. If 1 < p < p, the logic of the complete
information benchmark applies again: if there is any issuance activity, this must be when
cash reserves drop down to zero to avoid liquidation. In such a situation, the marginal
value of cash should be equal to the proportional issuance cost p, formally, V ∗x (0, y) = p.
Intuitively, this latter equality should require that the profitability prospects when the cash
reserves are depleted are sufficiently high. Accordingly, we conjecture the existence of an
(endogenous) threshold y∗i such that V
∗
x (0, y) = p for any y ≥ y∗i , whereas V ∗(0, y) = 0 for
any y ≤ y∗i . In this latter case, the profitability prospects are too low with regard to the
cost of external financing, and the firm defaults when the cash reserves are depleted.
Convergence toward the complete information benchmark. Finally, we expect that when
shareholders are increasingly confident that the profitability of the firm is µ, the value of the
firm tends to the one derived in the complete information benchmark. We should have for
all x ≥ 0
lim
y−→µ
V ∗(x, y) = Vµ(x).
Our heuristic discussion leads us to consider the variational system: find a smooth func-
tion V , a constant yi ∈ (−µ, µ) and a positive function b continuously differentiable almost
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everywhere over (−µ, µ) that solve
LV (x, y)− rV (x, y) = 0 on the domain {(x, y), 0 < x < b(y), −µ < y < µ}, (11)
V (0, y) = 0 ∀y ∈ (−µ, yi], (12)
Vx(0, y) = p ∀y ∈ [yi, µ), (13)
Vx(x, y) = 1, for x ≥ b(y), (14)
Vxy(b(y), y) = 0, (15)
lim
y−→µ
V (x, y) = Vµ(x) ∀x ≥ 0. (16)
Equation (15) ensures that the mapping x −→ V (x, y) is twice continuously differentiable
at the boundary function b so that the so-called super contact condition holds in our two-
dimensional model.17
We prove the existence and the uniqueness of a solution (V, y∗i , b
∗) to the system (11)-
(16). We show that the function V coincides with the value of the firm V ∗. We obtain an
analytical formula for the triple (V, y∗i , b
∗).
4.2 Solution to the shareholders’ problem
In this section, we focus on the case 1 < p < p and explain how to solve the system (11)-
(16).18 Then, we state our main result. Our analysis relies on a simple change of variable,
which will be proved very useful for both the mathematical treatment and the economic
analysis of the model.
We remark from equation (6) that, as long as the controls I and D are not activated, the
process Z = {Zt; t ≥ 0} with
Zt ≡ φ(Yt)−Xt (17)
remains constant. That is, keeping unchanged issuance and dividend policies, there is a
one-to-one mapping between the cash reserves and the profitability prospects. The change
of variable (17) allows us to restate problem (11)-(16) in the (z, y)-space and solve it ana-
lytically. The change of variable (17) also provides new economic insights that we comment
on below.
17Specifically, differentiating equation Vx(b(y), y) = 1 with respect to y and using Vxy(b(y), y) = 0 lead to
Vxx(b(y), y) = 0. We refer to Dumas (1991) for an insightful discussion of the super contact condition as an
optimality condition for singular control problems.
18We refer the reader to the appendix for the complete analysis.
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To develop the intuition, let us consider some admissible issuance and dividend policies
I and D leading to cash reserve process
Xt = φ(Yt)− φ(Y0) +X0 −Dt + It
p
.
It follows that
Zt = φ(Yt)−Xt = Dt − It
p
+ (φ(Y0)−X0).
The process Zt corresponds to the cash outflows from financing activities, Dt − Itp , cor-
rected for the initial amount φ(Y0)−X0. The process Zt increases whenever the firm reaches
a cash target level and decreases whenever the firm issues new shares. It measures the per-
formance record of the firm at time t and defines a one-to-one mapping between profitability
prospects and cash reserves that holds true as long as the firm neither pays dividends nor
issues new securities.
Therefore, in our two-dimensional setting, the determinants of the shareholders’ policy
at a given date t are the cash position Xt and the profitability prospects Yt; or, equivalently,
the firm’s performance Zt and the profitability prospects Yt; or, also equivalently, the cash
position Xt and the firm’s performance Zt. We will use these three points of view to develop
the economic implications of our model.
It is worth noting that the current cash outflow from financing activities, Dt− It
p
, is not a
sufficient statistic to define the performance of the firm at date t. The firm’s performance at
date t also depends on the initial profitability prospects Y0 through the relation φ(Y0)−X0.
The initial profitability prospects Y0 are not directly observable and follow, for instance,
from a specific analysis by financial analysts of the relevance of the firm’s project at the
early stage of the firm’s life. Thus, the performance of the firm is defined in light of the
initial assessment of the profitability prospects. We will see that the firm’s performance
process Z indicates whether the firm can issue new shares if needed.
Using the change of variable (17), we define
U(z, y) ≡ V (φ(y)− z, y),
and we restate problem (11)-(16) in the (z, y)-space.
In the (z, y)-space, the equation
1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2Vyy + 1
2
σ2Vxx + (µ
2 − y2)Vxy + yVx − rV (x, y) = 0
16
becomes
1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2Uyy(z, y)− rU(z, y) = 0. (18)
The solution to (18) is explicit and can be written in the form
U(z, y) = A(z)h1(y) +B(z)h2(y), (19)
where h1(y) = (µ+ y)
γ(µ− y)1−γ and h2(y) = (y+ µ)1−γ(µ− y)γ, with γ being the negative
root of the equation x2 − x− rσ2
2µ2
= 0. The functions A and B are to be determined.
The condition V (0, y) = 0 for all y ≤ yi becomes
U(φ(y), y) = U(z, ψ(z)) = 0, for all z ≤ zi,
where zi ≡ φ(yi) and where ψ(z) ≡ φ−1(z) = µe
2µ
σ2
z − 1
e
2µ
σ2
z + 1
. Thus, for a given performance
z, the real number ψ(z) ∈ (−µ,+µ) corresponds to the profitability prospects when cash
reserves are depleted, that is, when x = 0.
The condition Vx(0, y) = p becomes
Uz(z, ψ(z)) = −p,
which holds for any z ≥ zi. In other words, the firm issues new shares when cash reserves are
depleted only if its performance is higher than zi ≡ φ(yi) (equivalently, if the profitability
prospects when the cash reserves are depleted are higher than yi).
The condition Vx(b(y), y) = 1 becomes
Uz((φ− b)(y), y) = Uz(z, k(z)) = −1,
where k(z) ≡ inf{y | (φ − b)(y) = z}. Thus, according to the change of variable (17), k(z)
corresponds to the profitability prospects at the cash target level b(k(z)) = φ(k(z)) − z.
Therefore, in our two-dimensional setting, each performance z defines a cash target level
b(k(z)), the set of which forms the dividend boundary function. We will see that the func-
tion φ−b is invertible, so k(z) = (φ−b)−1(z). We will prove that k is an increasing function.
Intuitively, the higher the firm’s performance is, the higher the profitability prospects at the
cash target level.
17
The super contact condition Vxy(b(y), y) = 0 becomes
Uzy((φ− b)(y), y) = Uzy(z, k(z)) = 0.
The convergence condition to the complete information benchmark, lim
y−→µ
V (x, y) = Vµ(x),
becomes
lim
z−→∞
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = Vµ(x).
Indeed, the change of variable (17) leads to y = ψ(x + z) and, in turn, V (x, ψ(x + z)) =
U(z, ψ(x+ z)).
Overall, the free boundary problem (11)-(16) writes in the (z, y)-space in the following
form: find a function U , a constant zi, and a function k that solve the variational system
1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2Uyy(z, y)− rU(z, y) = 0 on the domain
{(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)}, (20)
U(z, ψ(z)) = 0 ∀z ≤ zi, (21)
Uz(z, ψ(z)) = −p ∀z ≥ zi, (22)
Uz(z, y) = −1, for k(z) ≤ y, (23)
Uxy(z, k(z)) = 0. (24)
lim
z−→∞
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = Vµ(x). (25)
We obtain an analytical solution (U, z∗i , k
∗) to the system (20)-(25) and thus a solution
(V, y∗i , b
∗) to the system (11)-(16) through the relations U(z, y) = V (φ(y) − z, y), k(z) =
(φ−b∗)−1(z) and, z∗i = φ(y∗i ). Below, we explain informally how we solve the system (20)-(25)
and state our main result.
We consider a solution (U, zi, k) to the system (20), (21), (22), (23), (24). For z ≥ zi, we
obtain from (19), (22), (23), (24) that the function k is implicitly defined by the equation
−h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z)) + h′2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)) +
2µ2
y∗
p = 0. (26)
We show that (26) defines over (zi,+∞) a unique continuously differentiable increasing
function k. Then, we set yi ≡ k(zi), and we deduce from (19), (21), (23), (24) that, for
z ≤ zi, the function k satisfies an ordinary differential equation, the terminal condition of
which is k(zi) = y
i. Finally, we show that there exists a unique zi = z
∗
i such that (25) is
satisfied. In turn, this uniquely determines the solution (U, z∗i , k
∗) to the system (20)-(25).
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Returning to the formulation of the problem in the (x, y)-space, we characterize the
dividend boundary function b∗. A main result is that the dividend boundary function b∗ is
nonmonotonic in the profitability prospects y. It reaches its maximum at yi∗ ≡ k(z∗i ). The
threshold yi∗ corresponds to the profitability prospects at the cash target level associated
with the performance z∗i = φ(y
∗
i ).
19 When the issuance cost p satisfies p ≥ p, we show that
the firm never issues new shares and that the dividend boundary function b∗ is increasing in
the profitability prospects. The next theorem summarizes and completes these findings.
Theorem 1 The value of the firm V ∗ solving (8) coincides with the unique solution (V, y∗i , b
∗)
to the system (11)-(16). The threshold y∗i corresponds to the required profitability prospects
above which the firm issues new shares when the cash reserves are depleted and below which
the firm is liquidated when it runs out of cash. Payments are made whenever cash reserves
hit the dividend boundary function b∗. The function b∗ is continuous over [−µ, µ] and satis-
fies b∗(y) = 0 for y ≤ y∗∗ and b∗(µ) = xµ, where xµ is the constant dividend boundary of the
complete information benchmark. The threshold y∗∗ = max{y ∈ (−µ, µ) | y = b∗−1(0)} > y∗
is well defined and corresponds to the minimum profitability prospects required by sharehold-
ers to run the project. The optimal cash reserve process is reflected along the function b∗ in
a horizontal direction on the (x, y)-plane. Furthermore:
If the proportional issuance cost p satisfies p ≥ p,
• y∗i = µ, so it is never optimal to recapitalize the firm. The firm is liquidated when it
runs out of cash, V ∗(0, y) = 0 for all y ∈ (−µ, µ).
• The dividend boundary function b is continuously increasing and differentiable.
If the proportional issuance cost p satisfies 1 < p < p,
• y∗i ∈ (y∗∗, µ), so that equity issuance takes place whenever the firm runs out of cash
if and only if the profitability prospects are greater than the threshold y∗i . At issuance
dates, the optimal cash reserve process is reflected in a horizontal direction on the
(x, y)-plane, the marginal value of cash V ∗x (0, y) is equal to the issuance cost p, and
V ∗(0, y) > 0 for all y > y∗i .
• The dividend boundary function b∗ is increasing for y ≤ yi∗ and decreasing for y ≥ yi∗,
where yi∗ satisfies (φ−b∗)(yi∗) = φ(y∗i ). The maximum cash target level, b∗(yi∗), satisfies
b∗(yi∗) > xµ. The dividend boundary function is not differentiable at yi∗.
19Recall that y∗i characterizes the profitability prospects above which the firm issues new shares when the
cash reserves are depleted. By construction, we have that k(z∗i ) = y
i∗ = k(φ(y∗i )) and thus (φ − b∗)(yi∗) =
φ(y∗i ).
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Theorem 1 delivers several results. In our model, uncertainty about the firm’s profitability
impacts the corporate cash policy, which, in terms of cash target levels, changes as the firm
learns about its long-term profitability. Two opposite effects are at work. First, a positive
shock to earnings increases profitability prospects and may induce the firm’s management to
lower cash target levels because of the cost of accumulating cash. Second, a firm has more
to lose from liquidity constraints when profitability prospects are high than when they are
low. This may induce the firm’s management to accumulate more cash when profitability
prospects increase. Theorem 1 shows that the second effect dominates when the firm has no
access to capital markets, while the first effect dominates when the firm does have access to
capital markets. As a consequence, the dividend boundary b∗ is increasing in the profitability
prospects when p ≥ p and is nonmonotonic in the profitability prospects when p < p. In the
latter case, shareholders increase the cash target levels after a new performance record as long
as the firm cannot tap the market, that is, as long as the firm’s performance is lower than z∗i
(equivalently, as long as the profitability prospects are lower than y∗i when the cash reserves
are depleted). When the cash reserves reach the level b∗(k(z∗i )) = b(y
i∗), shareholders decide
to lower the cash target levels because the firm now has access to the capital markets and
has an important amount of cash reserves that is costly to bear. Note that the dividend
boundary function converges to the complete information dividend threshold xµ when the
profitability prospects tend to µ. This implies the inequality b∗(yi∗) > xµ. Thus, the firm
reaches its higher level of cash reserves at the threshold of market access. At that moment,
the firm has a higher cash target level than what would have been optimal in a complete
information setting. Another salient feature that we comment on in the next section is the
nondifferentiability of b∗ at yi∗.
When p < p, in contrast to the complete information benchmark, firms either optimally
issue new equity or are liquidated. That is, if the profitability prospects when cash reserves
are depleted are above y∗i , then the firm issues new shares, whereas the firm is liquidated
if profitability prospects are lower than y∗i .
20 Thus, in our model, profitability issues create
liquidity issues, and ultimately, the firm is liquidated for liquidity reasons.21
20This is consistent with the empirical findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) that an SEO
reflects the corporate life cycle and that, without the offer proceeds, most firms would run out of cash the
year after the SEO.
21Hugonnier, Malamud and Morellec (2014) provide a model in which a firm sometimes issues new equity
and sometimes is liquidated. This feature relies on the occurrence of unpredictable arrivals of financiers. On
the contrary, in our model, issuing or not issuing equity is an event that can be anticipated by all participants
in the market. This latter feature is also true in the BWY (2019) real options model.
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The profitability prospects y∗∗ required to run the project are strictly larger than the
first-best liquidation threshold y∗. In particular, a negative exogenous shock that leads to
profitability prospects below y∗∗ triggers liquidation even if cash reserves are abundant.
5 Model Analysis
Despite its two-dimensional nature, our model leads to analytical formulae that allow for
a rigorous analysis of the interplay between dynamics of cash holdings and dynamics of
profitability prospects. Our analytical formulae also allow simple numerical illustrations
that yield additional insights. Figure 1 plots on the (x, y)-plane the dividend boundary
function b∗ and the curves z = φ(y) − x that link cash reserves and profitability prospects
for a firm’s different performance levels, z. It illustrates the joint dynamics of cash and
profitability prospects.22
The joint dynamics of cash and profitability prospects: an illustration based on Figure
1. Assume that, at date t = 0, the cash reserves X0 and the profitability prospects Y0
satisfy the equation Z0 = φ(Y0)−X0 with Z0 = −0.40 such that the pair (X0, Y0) is on the
green curve in Figure 1. The amount Z0 = −0.40 corresponds to the initial value of the
performance process Zt = φ(Yt)−Xt = Z0 +Dt− It
p
. As long as there are neither payments
nor issuances, Dt = It = 0, the performance process Z remains constant. Therefore, the
two-dimensional process (Xt, Yt) satisfies φ(Yt) − Xt = Z0 and thus evolves on the green
curve. If the cash reserves increase to the point of exceeding the dividend boundary function
b∗, cash is paid out, the cash reserve process is reflected back in the horizontal direction on
the (x, y)-plane, and the performance process increases. If performance records accumulate,
the process Zt will eventually increase to the value z = 0, so that the process (Xt, Yt) will
satisfy φ(Yt)−Xt = 0 and thus will evolve on the blue curve.
Consider now that the cash reserves decrease after a series of negative shocks on cash
flows to hit zero. Shareholders then decide whether to issue new shares. They do so whenever
the profitability prospects are larger than y∗i or, equivalently, whenever the performance of
the firm is above z∗i . When the firm issues new shares, the cash reserve process is reflected
back in the horizontal direction on the (x, y)-plane, and the performance process decreases
accordingly. If, as time passes, cumulative issuances become too large, the process (Xt, Yt)
22To ease comparisons, we use in our simulations the baseline parameters considered in studies in which
shareholders face only a liquidity concern; see, for instance, Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011) or DMRV (2011).
The parameters r, µ and σ are annualized; σ and µ are expressed in millions of dollars.
21
Figure 1: The dividend boundary function b∗ (black curve) and three performance level
curves z = φ(y)−x with, from bottom to top, z = −0.40, z = z∗i , z = 0. The parameters are
r = 0.1, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.2 and p = 1.5. For those parameters, y∗i = −0.1321, z∗i = −0.3571,
yi∗ = 0.1163, b(yi∗) = 0.6563 and xµ = 0.44. The threshold y∗i corresponds to the level
of profitability prospects above which the firm can issue new shares when cash reserves are
depleted. Accordingly, z∗i = φ(y
∗
i ) corresponds to the minimum level of performance that
allows the firm to issue new shares when cash reserves are depleted, and yi∗ = (φ− b∗)−1(z∗i )
corresponds to the profitability prospects at the cash target level when the performance is
z∗i .
will eventually evolve on a constant-performance curve below the blue curve z∗i = φ(y)− x.
The firm then runs the risk of being liquidated because, for such a level of performance, the
profitability prospects are too low compared to the financing cost p to allow shareholders to
issue new shares when cash reserves are depleted.
Our model results in a two-stage life cycle for the firm: a “probation” stage in which
the firm has no access to capital markets and a “mature” stage in which the firm does have
access to capital markets. Because of liquidity shocks, the firm can switch from the mature
stage to the probation stage, and vice versa. In the probation stage, cash target levels are
22
increasing in the profitability prospects. In the mature stage, the precautionary motive for
holding cash weakens, and cash target levels decline when the profitability prospects increase.
Thus, our model yields life-cycle stages for the corporate cash dynamics and predicts that the
firm’s cash holdings are the highest when the firm is at the market access threshold. These
findings are consistent with Drobetz, Halling and Schroder (2015), who empirically show the
relevance of the corporate life cycle for the dynamics and valuation of cash holdings. They
notably find evidence of increases in cash holdings in stages of the life cycle where access
to the market is more constrained and of decreases in cash holdings when the firms move
toward maturity.
It is worth noting the importance of the initial value of profitability prospects. Two
identical firms with the same cash outflow from financing activities, Dt − It
p
> 0, but with
different initial profitability prospects and thus different values for Z0, for example, Z
1
0 <
z∗i < Z
2
0 , can be in drastically different situations when cash reserves are depleted: it can
happen that firm 1 is liquidated because Z1t = Z
1
0 + Dt −
It
p
< z∗i , whereas firm 2 issues
new shares because Z2t = Z
2
0 + Dt −
It
p
≥ z∗i . Thus, our model predicts that the initial
profitability prospects, which may result, for instance, from financial analysts, have lasting
effects on the corporate cash policy. This feature is consistent with the important role of
specialized intermediaires in the financing of innovation as, for instance, pointed in Kerr and
Nanda (2015).
Figure 1 also illustrates that the dividend boundary function b∗ attains its maximum
at a kink. The fact that b∗ is nondifferentiable at its maximum yields new insights on the
corporate propensity to save at cash target levels, as we explain in the next paragraph.
Corporate propensity to save. What does a firm do with a marginal $1 when it is exactly
at its target level of cash? In standard models with only liquidity issues, the firm pays out $1
as a dividend whatever the importance of financing frictions. This generates the prediction
that firms have no propensity to save cash at the cash target level. In contrast, this is not
the case in our two-dimensional model in which the propensity to save cash is a function of
profitability prospects. This is a unique feature of our model.
Specifically, suppose that the firm is at its cash target level x = b∗(y) and consider what
happens after a positive shock to the cash flow. To account for the sign of the change in
cash flow over a small period of time h, we consider a
√
h Euler approximation of the model,
Xh = x+ σ
√
hB1,
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and
Yh = y +
µ2 − y2
σ
√
hB1,
where B1 is a standard Gaussian variable. Therefore, Xh − x, the amount of cash available
for distribution at time h, and Xh − b∗(Yh), the amount paid out to shareholders at time h,
satisfy
Xh − b∗(Yh) = Xh − (b∗(y) + b∗′(y)(Yh − y))
= Xh − x− b∗′(y)µ
2 − y2
σ
√
hB1
= (1− s(y))(Xh − x),
with
s(y) = b∗
′
(y)
µ2 − y2
σ
. (27)
The function s(y) indicates, for profitability prospects y, the percentage of each dollar earned
above the dividend boundary that is reinvested into the firm. The function s(y) corresponds
in our framework to the firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash flows that Almeida,
Campello and Weisbach (2004) introduced in their influential paper. The propensity to
save measures how much of its current cash flow a constrained firm will save. There is
no consensus in the literature about its sign. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004)
find evidence that financially constrained firms, because of their limited access to capital
markets, have a positive propensity to save. On the other hand, Riddick and Whited (2009)
find theoretically and empirically that firms have a negative propensity to save out of cash
flow.23 De´camps, Gryglewicz, Morellec, and Villeneuve (2017) find that the propensity to
save can be positive or negative depending on the correlation between temporary shocks and
permanent shocks to the cash flows.
Our two-dimensional model delivers novel insights. Our model relates the sign of the
propensity to save to the corporate life cycle of the firm. Specifically, formula (27) links
the propensity to save to the derivative of the dividend boundary function b∗ and yields the
following result. In the probation stage, after a new performance record, the firm increases its
cash target level and saves cash above cash target levels (the propensity to save is positive).
The firm reaches its maximum cash target level at the threshold of access to capital markets
for y = yi∗. In the mature stage, the firm has access to capital markets. It decreases its
cash target level after a new performance record and dissaves (the propensity to save is
23Riddick and Whited (2009) extend the two-period model of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004)
in several directions. Notably, their model is dynamic and allows capital investment.
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negative). The decision to dissave yields a discontinuity in the propensity to save at yi∗
that originates from the nondifferentiability of b∗ at yi∗. This break reflects the change in
the cash management policy when changing between corporate life-cycle stages. When its
performance level allows the firm to enter the mature stage, the cost of holding cash becomes
prominent, leading to a rupture in the propensity to save. Let us observe that because of the
nonmonotonicity of the dividend boundary function, the cash target level is not a sufficient
statistic to infer whether the propensity to save is positive or negative. In line with corporate
life-cycle theory, we must know what stage the firm is in to deduce the saving policy from
cash target levels. Finally, the propensity to save tends toward 0 when y tends toward µ,
reflecting the fact that the model converges to the complete information benchmark.
Numerical simulations provide additional insights. Figure 2 is representative of our nu-
merical simulations and plots the propensity to save for proportional issuance costs p = 1.5
and p = 1.05 (with other baseline parameters remaining the same). In the probation stage,
the propensity to save is decreasing. In the mature stage, it is increasing for large issuance
costs (left). For low issuance costs (right), the propensity to save is slightly decreasing when
the firm enters in its mature phase, and then it is increasing. Overall, our model predicts a
negative relationship between cash target levels and the corporate propensity to save cash.
Figure 2 also shows that the propensity to save is increasing in the cost of external fi-
nancing in the probation stage. We also get the prediction that a firm in a costly issuance
environment dissaves more aggressively in its mature stage than a firm in a cheap issuance
environment. The reason is that both the firm’s optimal level of cash and required prof-
itability prospects to access the mature stage increase with the cost of external financing.
It follows that a high-cost firm has more slack with which to respond to positive shocks
to earnings and dissaves more aggressively in the mature stage to counteract the cost of
holding cash. Specifically, for p = 1.5, the maximum cash target level is b(yi∗) = 0, 6563,
far above the cash target level xµ = 0, 4457 that prevails in the complete information case.
The propensity to save is around −80% for profitability prospects just above the threshold
yi∗ = 0, 1163. For p = 1.05 the maximum cash target level 0, 2358 is slightly higher than the
constant cash target level of the complete information case xµ = 0, 1829. The propensity to
save is around −5% for profitability prospects just above the threshold yi∗ = −0, 1025.
So far, we have focused on the propensity to save. It is worth noting that 1 − s(y)
corresponds to the percentage of each dollar earned above the dividend boundary that is
distributed to shareholders in the form of cash. Therefore, the amount 1 − s(y) can be
interpreted as the payout ratio function of the firm. In standard models with no uncertainty
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Figure 2: The propensity to save as a function of profitability prospects. (Left) The parame-
ters are r = 0.1, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.2 and p = 1.5. (Right) The parameters are r = 0.1, σ = 0.3,
µ = 0.2 and p = 1.05
about long-term profitability, the payout ratio is 100%, whatever the costs of external financ-
ing. Thus, in our two-dimensional model, a dividend decision is made when cash reserves
reach the cash target level b∗(y). Shareholders then receive 1−s(y) percent of the cash above
b∗(y).
Figure 3 depicts the mapping y −→ 1− s(y) and delivers additional insights. Our model
suggests that a cash-constrained firm with uncertain long-term profitability pays very little
in dividends as long as it has no access to the market. This effect is even more true when
the cost of external financing is high.
At the market access threshold, the firm has a significant pile of cash and high profitabil-
ity prospects (both of these levels are all the higher because external financing costs are
high). This provides the firm with the ability to generate and sustain free cash flows. Once
profitability prospects are sufficiently high, it is then optimal to initiate dividend payments.
This causes a jump in the payout ratio function (equivalently, a jump in the propensity to
save, as already explained). This result is in line with DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006),
whose analysis suggests that, if well-established firms had not paid dividends as observed,
their cash balances would be enormous, thus granting extreme discretion to managers of
these firms.
Finally, let us observe that the jump in the payout ratio is not related to a jump in firm
value, which continuously evolves as a function of cash reserves and profitability prospects.
Our model thereby provides an example in which the jump of a key indicator of the firm’s
governance is not signaling. There are no asymmetries of information in our model. All our
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findings result from the (endogenous) dynamics of the interaction between learning about
long-term profitability and the cost and benefit of holding cash.
Figure 3: The payout ratio as a function of profitability prospects. (Left) The parameters
are r = 0.1, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.2 and p = 1.5. (Right) The parameters are r = 0.1, σ = 0.3,
µ = 0.2 and p = 1.05
Firm dynamics. Our model also delivers new insights into the dynamics of firm value
across life stages. We first consider the firm value process between two consecutive dates of
issuance decision and payment decision. We saw that for a given performance z ∈ [φ(y∗∗),∞),
payment occurs at time τz ≡ {t ≥ 0 |Xt = b∗(k∗(z))}, and issuance (or liquidation) at time
τ0 = {t ≥ 0 |Xt− = 0}. Thus, the firm value process can be written on time interval [0, τ0∧τz]
as a function of the cash reserve process {Xt, t ≥ 0}. We use the change of variable (17) to
obtain that V ∗(x, y) = V ∗(x, ψ(x + z)), and we denote W ∗(x, z) ≡ V ∗(x, ψ(x + z)). Then,
by applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process {W ∗(Xt, z), t ≥ 0}, we easily obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 For a given performance, z ≥ φ(y∗∗), the mapping x −→ W ∗(x, z) is in-
creasing on [0, b∗(k∗(z))]. The firm value process {W ∗(Xt, z), t ≥ 0} satisfies, for any
t ∈ [0, τ0 ∧ τz], the dynamics
dW ∗(Xt, z) = rW ∗(Xt, z) dt + σW ∗x (Xt, z) dBt,
with
σW ∗x (x, z) = σV
∗
x (x, ψ(x+ z)) + σψ
′(x+ z)V ∗y (x, ψ(x+ z)), (28)
so that the volatility of the firm at cash target b∗(k∗(z)) satisfies
σW ∗x (b
∗(k∗(z)), z) = σ +
µ2 − k∗(z)2
σ
V ∗y (b
∗(k∗(z)), k∗(z)). (29)
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The mapping x −→ W ∗(x, z) represents the value of the firm as a function of the cash
reserves for a fixed level of performance z.24 It corresponds to the value of the firm between
two consecutive dates of issuance decision and payment decision. Formulae (28) and (29)
give the volatility of the firm as a function of the cash reserves.
For a fixed performance z, an increase in cash also increases profitability prospects so that
the relation x− φ(y) = z holds true between two consecutive dates of issuance decision and
payment decision. Then, two effects are at work. First, an increase in cash diminishes the
precautionary motive for holding cash. The marginal value of cash decreases in cash levels.
Accordingly, one more unit of cash has a larger impact on the value of the firm when the
latter is initially low than when it is high. Formally, the mapping x −→ V ∗(x, y) is concave,
as proven in the Appendix.25 Second, an increase in cash increases profitability prospects.
The ongoing project is more likely to have a positive long-term profitability. Accordingly,
one more unit of profitability prospects has a larger impact on the value of the firm when the
latter is initially high than when it is low. Formally, the mapping y −→ V ∗(x, y) is convex.
Our numerical study shows that the first effect dominates when the firm has proven
access to the market, in the sense that its performance z is sufficiently above the market
access threshold z∗i . The second effect, which we call the learning effect, dominates when the
firm is fully in the probation stage in the sense that its performance z is sufficiently below
z∗i . Close to the market access threshold (when z is around z
∗
i ), both effects are present.
Specifically, Figure 4 illustrates that the mapping x −→ W ∗(x, z) is concave for z values
sufficiently above z∗i , convex for z values sufficiently below z
∗
i , and convex then concave for
z values around z∗i .
Additionally, Figure 4 illustrates that the mapping z −→ W ∗(x, z) is increasing, as
we show in the Appendix. A direct implication follows: Because the firm’s performance
process is increasing in cumulative payments and decreasing in the cumulative issuances, our
two-dimensional model predicts that, by holding liquid assets constant, there is a positive
relationship between payments and firm value and a negative relationship between issuances
and firm value.
Now, we turn to the volatility of the firm. Figure 5 depicts, for different issuance costs, the
volatility of the firm as a function of the cash reserves with different levels of performance z
(Equation (28)). In line with the previous observations, the volatility of the firm is decreasing
in the cash reserves for z sufficiently above z∗i and increasing in the cash reserves for z
sufficiently below z∗i . Close to the market access threshold (when z is around z
∗
i ), the
24The amount φ(y∗∗) is the minimum level of performance required by shareholders to run the firm.
25See Proposition 11.
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Figure 4: The value of the firm as a function of cash reserves for three levels of performance,
z = −0.4 (black curve), z = z∗i (red curve) and z = 0 (green curve). The parameters are
r = 0.1, µ = 0.2, σ = 0.3 and p = 1.5.
volatility of the firm is increasing and then decreasing in the cash reserves.
Noting that the mapping x −→ W ∗(x, z) is increasing, we obtain new testable results on
the relationship between the value of the firm and its volatility across firm life-cycle stages.
Our model predicts that, for firms with proven access to the market, we should observe a
negative relationship between firm value and volatility. For firms still far from accessing the
market, we should observe a positive relationship between value and volatility. The negative
relationship between the firm’s value and its volatility is a standard feature of corporate
cash models with complete information.26 The positive relationship between the volatility
of the firm and its value is a well-known feature of corporate models with deep-pocketed
shareholders27 and holds true in our first-best benchmark. Our study shows that the result
still holds for cash-constrained shareholders who learn about long-term profitability and have
no access to the financial markets. Close to the market access threshold, the volatility of
the firm is an inverted U-shaped function of the value of the firm, reflecting the two effects.
26See Bolton, Chen, and Wang ( 2011) and DMRV (2011), among many others.
27We refer to the literature initiated by Merton (1973) and Leland (1994).
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Figure 5: The volatility of the firm as a function of cash reserves for two different levels of
issuance costs. (Left) The parameters are r = 0.1, µ = 0.2, σ = 0.3, z = −0.4 (black curve),
z = z∗i (green curve) and z = 0 (red curve) and p = 1.5. (Right) The parameters are r = 0.1,
µ = 0.2, σ = 0.3, z = −0.4 (black curve), z = z∗i (green curve) and z = 0 (red curve) and
p = 2.
Therefore, our model suggests that the relationships between the value of the firm and its
volatility can drastically change in transition phases between life-cycle stages.
In models with complete information, the volatility of the firm corresponds to the volatil-
ity of the cash flows times the marginal value of cash (that is, σV ′µ(x) with the notations of
Proposition 2). The volatility of the firm is more involved in our two-dimensional model.
The novel insight is the learning effect that links the volatility of the firm and the marginal
value of profitability prospects (that is, the second term of the right-hand side of (28)).
Equation (29) highlights that the volatility of the firm at cash target levels is larger than
the volatility of cash flows, whereas these volatilities coincide in the complete information
benchmark.28
Two additional insights on the firm’s volatility follow from our model. First, we observe
in Figure 5 that the volatility of the firm when cash reserves are depleted is increasing in the
performance level z. Thus, the model predicts that the higher the profitability prospects, the
higher the volatility of the firm is at issuance dates. Second, at cash target levels, the firm
reaches its higher level of volatility when it is at the threshold of access to capital markets,
that is, for z = z∗i . This is consistent with the prediction that the dynamics of cash holdings
change drastically when the firm’s performance crosses the threshold z∗i .
28Technically, at the limit, for z =∞, the model coincides with the complete information benchmark. We
show in the Appendix (see Propositions 7 and 11) that lim
z−→∞W
∗(x, z) = Vµ(x) and that lim
z−→∞W
∗
x (x, z) =
V ′µ(x). In particular, we have the equality σ lim
z−→∞W
∗
x (b
∗(k∗(z)), z), z) = σ.
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6 Conclusion
We study the corporate cash management of an all-equity firm that is conducting a project
whose long-term profitability is unknown and that faces financing constraints. We show
that the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of holding cash evolves as shareholders
learn about profitability and yields a two-stage life-cycle for the firm: a probation stage and
a mature stage. The firm can go back and forth between the two stages. In the mature
stage, the firm issues new shares when cash is exhausted. In the probation stage, the firm
has no access to capital markets and is liquidated when cash reserves are depleted. Issuing
new shares requires a sufficiently high level of profitability prospects. A payment decision is
made when the total flow of cash into the firm reaches a target level, which depends on the
profitability prospects. Shareholders reinvest into the firm a proportion of cash above the
cash target level and pay out the complement as dividends. Saving and payout decisions are
functions of the profitability prospects. Cash target levels increase in the probation stage
and decrease in the mature stage. Payout ratios are low in the probation stage and high
in the mature stage. Thus, the model offers a rationale for stylized facts stemming from
the life-cycle theory of the firm. Young firms hold more cash and pay little in dividends,
while firms with proven profitability are more prone to pay dividends and decrease their cash
target levels.
Our study goes beyond these implications and delivers new predictions that call for
additional theoretical and empirical studies. We obtain that, the propensity to save cash at
cash target levels is positive and decreasing in the profitability prospects in the probation
stage, while it is the opposite (negative and increasing) in the mature stage. The model
predicts that firms reach their maximum level of cash reserves at the market access threshold.
At that moment, the firm’s volatility also reaches a maximum value. In the probation stage,
the model predicts a positive relationship between the firm’s value and its volatility, while
the relationship is negative for firms with proven access to the market. Close to the market
access threshold, the volatility of the firm is an inverted U-shaped function of the value of
the firm. When the costs of external financing increase, both the profitability prospects
necessary to access to the market and the cash target levels increase. This implies that when
firms access the market, they dissave more aggressively when costs of external financing
are high than in an environment with low costs of external financing. Overall, our model
suggests that corporate cash policy and the dynamics of firm value drastically change in
transition phases between life-cycle stages. Additionally, the model suggests that the initial
assessment of the firm’s long term profitability has long lasting consequences on its corporate
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cash management and matters for evaluating its performance at any future date.
As explained in the introduction, our model adresses the case of all-equity young firms
that have little collateral to offer. Well established firms with more elaborated financial
structure face also corporate cash management issues, and learn about their long term prof-
itability when they launch new projects or engage in major restructurings. Clearly, future
learning models should integrate into the analysis a wider range of financial tools, especially
debt issuance and the use of credit lines. We lack of studies on the joint evolution of cash
holdings, debt, and profitability prospects. In addition, note that other learning issues arise
in corporate finance. For instance, some studies focus on learning about the state of the
economy, or learning about a rival’s charateristics, nevertheless avoiding cash management
considerations.29 Here again we lack of studies that integrate these learning issues in a
setting of constrained financing. These and related questions must await for future work.
29See for instance, Grenadier and Malenko (2010), De´camps and Marioti (2004).
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8 Appendix
8.1 First-best benchmark
Proposition 1 relies on the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The value of the firm V ∗ can be written in the form
V ∗(x, y) = x+ sup
(I,D)∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rs (Ys − rXs) ds
]
≤ x+ µ
r
. (30)
Proof of Lemma 1. For all t > 0 and all admissible controls I and D, we have
e−r(t∧τ0)Xt∧τ0 = x+
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsdXs − r
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsXs ds.
Because Xt is nonnegative for t ≤ τ0 and Y is bounded above by µ, we obtain
e−r(t∧τ0)Xt∧τ0 +
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs(dDs − dIs) = x+
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsdRs − r
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsXs ds (31)
≤ x+ µ
r
+ σ
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsdBs.
Applying the optional sampling theorem to the uniformly FB-martingale
(∫ t
0
e−rsdBs
)
t≥0
,
we obtain after taking expectations,
E
[
e−r(t∧τ0)Xt∧τ0 +
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs(dDs − dIs)
]
≤ x+ µ
r
.
Letting t goes to +∞, we obtain for all (x, y) ∈ [0,∞)× (−µ, µ)
V (x, y; I,D) ≤ x+ µ
r
<∞.
Thus, the value function V ∗ is finite. We obtain (30) from equations (3) and (31). 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us define
Γ(y) = sup
τ∈T R
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsYsds
]
.
Standard results in optimal stopping theory30 yield that the optimal value function Γ is C1
on [0,∞) and that a threshold strategy τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 |Yt = y∗} is optimal. The value
function Γ can be written in terms of the free boundary problem:{
1
2σ2
(y + µ)2(µ− y)2Γ′′(y)− rΓ(y) + y = 0, y ≥ y∗,
Γ(y∗) = 0, Γ
′
(y∗) = 0.
30See for instance Peskir and Shiryaev (2006).
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Standard computations yield{
Vˆ (x, y) = x, −µ < y ≤ y∗,
Vˆ (x, y) = x+ y
r
− h1(y)
h1(y∗)
y∗
r
y∗ ≤ y < µ, (32)
where
h1(y) = (µ+ y)
γ(µ− y)1−γ, y∗ = −µ
1− 2γ < 0, (33)
and where γ is the negative root of the equation x2 − x− rσ
2
2µ2
= 0. (34)
It follows from (32), (33) that Vˆ (x, y) is increasing and convex in y.
Proof of Corollary 1. Because the cash reserves are positive for all admissible controls, it
follows from (30) that,
x+ sup
(I,D)∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rsYs ds
]
is an upper bound for V ∗. From Equation (3), any admissible control (I,D) acts on
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rsYs ds
]
by modifying only the FR-stopping time τ0. Thus,
sup
(I,D)∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rsYs ds
]
≤ sup
τ∈T R
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsYsds
]
,
which implies that the function V ∗ is bounded above by Vˆ . 2
8.2 Complete information benchmark.
In this section, we consider that the firm’s long-term profitability is known and is equal to µ.
We develop the mathematical formulation of Proposition 2. This formulation yields useful
formulae for the proof of Theorem 1. We prove also in this section the Corollary 2.
8.2.1 No equity issuance
We start the analysis when security issuances are not allowed. Then, the dynamics of the
cash reserve satisfy
dXt = µ dt+ σdBt − dDt,
38
and thus the shareholders’ problem writes
V µ(x) = sup
D∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rsdDs
]
, (35)
where τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt = 0}. The following result is due to Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995).
Proposition 4 The value function V µ of problem (35) is concave, twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and it satisfies the following HJB equation on (0,+∞):
max
{
σ2
2
V
′′
µ + µV
′
µ − rV µ, 1− V ′µ
}
= 0.
Moreover, we have V µ(x) =
e−βγx − eβ(γ−1)x
−βγe−βγxµ + (1− γ)βeβ(γ−1)xµ 0 ≤ x ≤ xµ,
V µ(x) = x− xµ + µr , x ≥ xµ,
(36)
with
xµ =
1
β(1− 2γ) ln(
1− γ
γ
)2 = 2
y∗
µ
φ(y∗), (37)
where (33) and (34) define y∗ and γ and where β = 2µ
σ2
. Any excess of cash over the dividend
boundary xµ is paid out to shareholders, such that the cash reserve process is reflected back
each time it reaches xµ. The process D = {Dt; t ≥ 0} with
Dt = (x− xµ)+1 t=0 + Lxµt 1 t>0 (38)
is the optimal dividend payment process. In equation (38), Lxµ denotes the so-called local
time process solution to the Skohorod problem31 at xµ for the drifted Brownian motion µt+Bt.
8.2.2 Equity issuance
When security issuances are allowed at a proportional issuance cost p > 1, the dynamics of
the cash reserves satisfy
dXt = µ dt+ σdBt − dDt + dIt
p
,
and shareholders’ problem writes
Vµ(x) = sup
I,D∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rs(dDs − dIs)
]
(39)
where τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt = 0}. The following proposition is due to Lokka and Zervos (2008)
and provides a rigorous formulation of Proposition 2 in the main text.
31See Karatzas and Shreve (1991) page 210.
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Proposition 5 The value function defined in (39) is concave, twice continously differen-
tiable and it satisfies the following HJB equation on (0,+∞):
max{σ
2
2
V
′′
µ + µV
′
µ − rVµ, 1− V ′µ, V ′µ − p} = 0.
Moreover, we have
• If p ≥ V ′µ(0) then, Vµ(x) = V µ(x) for all x ≥ 0.
• If p < V ′µ(0) then, Vµ(x) =
1− γ
βγ
y∗
µ
e−βγ(x−xµ) +
γ
β(γ − 1)
y∗
µ
eβ(γ−1)(x−xµ) 0 ≤ x ≤ xµ,
Vµ(x) = x− xµ + µr , x ≥ xµ,
(40)
where xµ is defined as the unique solution to the equation
p = −y
∗
µ
(1− γ)eγβxµ + y
∗
µ
γe(1−γ)βxµ . (41)
Any excess of cash over the dividend boundary xµ is paid out to shareholders, so that the
cash reserve process is reflected back each time it reaches xµ. There is equity issuance
whenever the firm runs out of cash, so that the cash reserve process is reflected back
each time it reaches 0. The processes D = {Dt; t ≥ 0} and I = {It; t ≥ 0} with
Dt = (x− xµ)+1 t=0 + Lxµt 1 t>0 and It = L0t1 t>0 (42)
are the optimal dividend payment and equity issuance processes. In equation (42), Lxµ
and L0 denote the solution to the Skohorod problem at xµ and at 0 for the drifted
Brownian motion µt+Bt.
Hereafter, we will note p = V
′
µ(0). The thresholds xµ and xµ defined in (37) and (41)
satisfy xµ > xµ. Moreover, equation (36) yields that p =
1−γ
−γ e
γβxµ . We deduce that for
1 < p < p, we have
p <
1− γ
−γ e
βγxµ . (43)
We will use later this inequality.
Proof of Corollary 2. We use equation (30) and the fact that the process Yt is bounded
by µ to get
V ∗(x, y) ≤ x+ sup
(I,D)∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rs(µ− rXs) ds
]
.
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Proceeding analogously as in the proof of Lemma 1, we have
Vµ(x) = x+ sup
(I,D)∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rs(µ− rXs) ds
]
,
which leads to V (x, y) ≤ Vµ(x). 2
8.3 Model Solution
We devote this section to the proof of Theorem 1. We use the following notations and
relationships throughout the proof.
• The function h1(y) = (y + µ)γ(µ− y)1−γ is decreasing and convex over (−µ, µ) and
h′1(y) = h1(y)(
µ2
y∗
− y) 1
µ2 − y2 , h
′′
1(y) =
2rσ2
(µ2 − y2)2h1(y). (44)
• The function h2(y) = (y + µ)1−γ(µ− y)γ is increasing and convex over (−µ, µ) and
h′2(y) = h2(y)(−
µ2
y∗
− y) 1
µ2 − y2 , h
′′
2(y) =
2rσ2
(µ2 − y2)2h2(y). (45)
• For all y ∈ (−µ, µ)
h1(y)h2(y) = µ
2 − y2, and h′1(y)h2(y)− h′2(y)h1(y) =
2µ2
y∗
. (46)
• The function ψ(z) = φ−1(z) = µe
βz − 1
eβz + 1
with β =
2µ
σ2
, is increasing over R and
ψ′(z) =
µ2 − ψ(z)2
σ2
. (47)
• For all z ∈ R,
h1(ψ(z)) = 2µe
(γ−1)βz 1
e−βz + 1
, h2(ψ(z)) = 2µe
−γβz 1
e−βz + 1
. (48)
As for the complete information benchmark, it is useful to start the analysis under the
assumption that the shareholders are not allowed to issue new shares.
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8.3.1 No equity issuance
Thus, in this subsection we solve the problem
V (x, y) = sup
D∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rtdDt
]
, (49)
where τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt = 0} with Xt = φ(Yt)− φ(y) + x−Dt.
As a preliminary but essential step, we establish a standard verification Lemma that
specifies conditions under which a function V defined on [0,∞) × (−µ, µ) is a majorant of
the value function V of the problem (49).
Lemma 2 (Verification Lemma) Assume there exists a function V defined on [0,∞) ×
(−µ, µ) that satisfies
1. V is twice differentiable,
2. V has bounded first derivatives,
3. V (0, y) = 0 for all y ∈ (−µ, µ) and
max(LV − rV, 1− Vx) ≤ 0 on [0,∞)× (−µ, µ),
then V is a majorant of V .
Proof of Lemma 2. See the online appendix. 2
Second, we explicitly build such a majorant. To this end, we prove that the following
variational problem
LV (x, y)− rV (x, y) = 0 on the domain {(x, y), 0 < x < b(y), −µ < y < µ}, (50)
V (0, y) = 0 ∀y ∈ (−µ, µ), (51)
Vx(x, y) = 1, for x ≥ b(y), (52)
Vxy(b(y), y) = 0, (53)
lim
y−→µ
V (x, y) = V µ(x) ∀x ≥ 0, (54)
has a unique solution (V, b) (see Proposition 6), such that V satisfies Lemma 2 (see Proposi-
tion 7) and thus dominates V . Finally, we show in Proposition 8 that V can be reached by
an admissible policy and thus coincides with the solution V to the problem (49). This last
step also provides the optimal dividend policy and concludes the study of problem (49).
We start with a technical lemma.
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Lemma 3 The ordinary differential equation
g′(y) = f(g(y), y), (55)
g(µ) = xµ, (56)
with
f(x, y) =
σ2
µ2 − y2
yy∗ +
(
µ− rσ2
(
y∗
µ
)2
1
µ
)
φ−1
(
− µ
y∗ x
)
yy∗ + µφ−1
(
− µ
y∗ x
) (57)
defined on the domain {(x, y) ∈ [0,∞)× (−µ, µ) |x > y∗
µ
φ(y y
∗
µ
)} has a unique solution. The
solution g is C1 and increasing over [y∗∗, µ] where the threshold y∗∗ ≡ g−1(0) is well defined
and strictly larger than y∗.
Moreover, if we define b = max(g, 0), then k = (φ − b)−1 : [φ(y∗∗),∞) −→ [y∗∗, µ) is a
well defined C1 increasing function. The function k is the unique solution to the ordinary
differential equation
k
′
(z) = Θ(z, k(z)), (58)
lim
z−→∞
φ(k(z))− z = xµ, (59)
with
Θ(z, y) =
µ3
y∗rσ2
µ2 − y2
σ2
ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(y)− z)
)
µ− yy∗
y∗ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(y)− z)
) (60)
defined on the domain {(z, y) ∈ R× (−µ, µ) |φ(y)− z > max(0, y∗
µ
φ(y y
∗
µ
))}.
Proof of Lemma 3. See the online appendix 2
We are now in a position to solve the system (50)-(54).
Proposition 6 Let us consider the functions b and k defined in Lemma 3 and the function
(x, y) −→ V (x, y) defined on [0,∞)× (−µ, µ) by the relations
V (0, y) = 0, for y ∈ (−µ, µ),
V (x, y) = A (φ(y)− x)
(
h1(y)− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ (φ(y)−x)h2(y)
)
, for 0 ≤ x ≤ b(y), y ∈ (−µ, µ),
V (x, y) = x− b(y) + V (b(y), y), for x ≥ b(y), y ∈ (−µ, µ),
(61)
where
A(z) =
σ2
4
(
y∗
µ
)2(
1
µ
)2(
h′1(k(z))e
− 2
σ2
µ2
y∗ z − h′2(k(z))
)
. (62)
Then, the couple (V, b) is the unique solution to the system (50)-(54). Furthermore, the
function b : [y∗∗, µ] −→ [0, xµ] is C1 and increasing.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Having in mind the change of variable (17), we are looking for
a smooth function U defined on [0,∞) × (−µ, µ) and a C1 function k : R −→ (−µ, µ) that
solve the variational system
1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2Uyy(z, y)− rU(z, y) = 0 on {(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)}, (63)
U(z, ψ(z)) = 0, for z ∈ R, (64)
Uz(z, y) = −1, for k(z) ≤ y, (65)
Uxy(z, k(z)) = 0, (66)
lim
z−→∞
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = V µ(x). (67)
First, we establish a set of necessary conditions for the existence of such a pair (U, k) by
observing that any solution to the o.d.e. (63) can be written in the form
U(z, y) = A(z)h1(y) +B(z)h2(y), (68)
where (44) and (45) define h1 and h2. Using (68), we obtain from (65) and (66) that
A′(z) = h′2(k(z))
y∗
2µ2
, and B′(z) = −h′1(k(z))
y∗
2µ2
. (69)
Using again (68), we rewrite (64) in the form
A(z) = −B(z)h2(ψ(z))
h1(ψ(z))
= −B(z)e− 2σ2 µ
2
y∗ z. (70)
Taking the derivative of (70), we obtain
A′(z) = −B′(z)e− 2σ2 µ
2
y∗ z +B(z)
2
σ2
µ2
y∗
e−
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ z
which yields using again (70),
A(z) = −σ
2y∗
2µ2
(
A′(z) +B′(z)e−
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ z
)
. (71)
Using (68) and (70), and plugging (69) into (71) yield that,
U(z, y) = A(z)
(
h1(y)− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ (z)h2(y)
)
, (72)
where
A(z) =
σ2
4
(
y∗
µ
)2(
1
µ
)2(
h′1(k(z))e
− 2
σ2
µ2
y∗ z − h′2(k(z))
)
. (73)
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Taking the derivative of (71) and using (69), we obtain that
k′(z) =
2µ2
σ2y∗
h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z)) + h
′
2(k(z))h1(ψ(z))
h
′′
1(k(z))h2(ψ(z))− h′′2(k(z))h1(ψ(z))
. (74)
A computation based on formulae (44)-(48) yields that
k′(z) =
µ3
y∗rσ2
µ2 − k(z)2
σ2
ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(k(z))− z)
)
µ− k(z)y∗
y∗ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(k(z))− z)
) , (75)
which is positive on the domain φ(k(z))− z > max(0, y∗
µ
φ(y
∗
µ
k(z))).
Thus, (72), (73) and (75) is a set of necessary conditions for the existence of a smooth
solution (U, k) to (63), (64), (65), (66). It remains to find a necessary condition for a solution
to satisfy (67). Below we prove that U satisfies (67) if and only if lim
z−→∞
φ(k(z)) − z = xµ.
From Lemma 3, it will imply that k = k. To do this, we use (48) and (73) to write
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = A(z)
[
h1(ψ(x+ z))− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ zh2(ψ(x+ z)
]
,
in the form
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) =
σ2
4
(
y∗
µ
)2(
1
µ
)2
f(x)∆(z)
1 + e−βz
1 + e−β(x+z)
, (76)
with
f(x) = e(γ−1)βx(1− e(1−2γ)βx),
∆(z) = h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z))− h′2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)).
Observing that k(z) = ψ((φ(k(z)) − z) + z) and using relations (44), (45), (48), we obtain
the following asymptotics
h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z)) ∼z=∞ 2µ(γ − 1)eγβ(φ(k(z))−z),
h′2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)) ∼z=∞ −2µγe(1−γ)β(φ(k(z))−z),
yielding
lim
z−→∞
∆(z) = lim
z−→∞
2µ
(
(γ − 1)eγβ(φ(k(z))−z) − γe(1−γ)β(φ(k(z))−z)) . (77)
Using (36), we observe that
V µ(x) = f(x)
eβγxµ
β(γ + (γ − 1)e(2γ−1)βxµ) . (78)
It then follows from (76), (77), (78) that lim
z−→∞
U(z, ψ(x + z)) = V µ(x) is equivalent to
lim
z−→∞
φ(k(z))− z = xµ.
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Thus, a smooth solution (U, k) to (63)-(67), if it exists, must satisfy (72), (73) where
k = k is uniquely defined in Lemma 3. Conversely, a direct computation shows that the
function defined by (72), (73) with k = k is a smooth solution to (63)-(67). Finally, posing
z = φ(y)− x in (72) and (73) leads to (61) and (62) where b is uniquely defined in Lemma
3. Thus, the couple (V, b) defined in Proposition 6 is the unique solution to the system
(50)-(54). Observe that the uniqueness of the function V comes from the uniqueness of the
function b which follows from condition (67). 2
To prove that V = V , we proceed in two steps. First, we show in Proposition 7 that the
function V solution to (63)-(67) satisfies the assumptions of the verification Lemma 2, which
implies that V ≤ V . Second, we construct an admissible policy for problem (49), the value
of which coincides with V . This latter result implies that V ≤ V .
Proposition 7 The function V defined in Proposition 6 satisfies the assumptions of Lemma
2.
Proof of Proposition 7. It is clear from (61) that V is twice continuously differentiable on
any open set in (0,∞)×(−µ, µ) away from the set {(x, y), x = b(y)}. By construction Vx and
Vxx are continuous across the boundary b. Therefore, to prove that V is twice differentiable
on (0,∞) × (−µ, µ), we only have to show that the functions Vy and Vyy are continuous
across the boundary b, that is
lim
x−→b(y)−
Vy(x, y) = −b′(y) + ν ′(y), (79)
lim
x−→b(y)−
Vyy(x, y) = −b
′′
(y) + ν
′′
(y),
where the function ν is defined on (−µ, µ) by the relation
ν(y) = A(φ(y)− b(y))
(
h1(y)− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ (φ(y)−b(y))h2(y)
)
.
Let us define
H(y) ≡ e 2σ2 µ
2
y∗ (φ(y)−b(y)) =
h1(ψ(φ(y)− b(y))
h2(ψ(φ(y)− b(y))
.
Using the relations (44),(45),(46),(47), we obtain
H ′(y) =
2µ2
σ2y∗
(φ′(y)− b′(y))H(y). (80)
Remembering the relations (69) and (71) and the definition of k, we observe that
A(z) = −σ
2y∗
2µ2
(
A′(φ(y)− b(y)) +B′(φ(y)− b(y)) 1
H(y)
)
.
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We are in a position to compute the derivative of ν. We have,
ν ′(y) = A(φ(y)− b(y))(h′1(y)−H(y)h′2(y))
+ (φ′(y)− b′(y))A′(φ(y)− b(y))(h1(y)−H(y)h2(y))− A(φ(y)− b(y))H ′(y)h2(y).
Using the relations (80), (71), (69) and the definition of k, the second term of the right-hand
side is equal to
(φ′(y)− b′(y)) y
∗
2µ2
(h′2(y)h1(y)− h′1(y)h2(y)).
We note that the change of variable V (x, y) = U(φ(y)− x, y) leads to the relations
Vy(x, y) = φ
′(y)Uz(φ(y)− x, y) + Uy(φ(y)− x, y), (81)
Vyy(x, y) = φ
′′
(y)Uz(φ(y)− x, y) + φ′(y)2Uzz(φ(y)− x, y)
+2φ′(y)Uzy(φ(y)− x, y) + Uyy(φ(y)− x, y). (82)
As a consequence,
ν ′(y) = (φ′(y)− b′(y)) y
∗
2µ2
((h′2(y)h1(y)− h′1(y)h2(y))
+A(φ(y)− b(y))(h′1(y)− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ (φ(y)−b(y))h′2(y))
= −φ′(y) + b′(y) + Uy(φ(y)− b(y), y)
= b
′
(y) + lim
x−→b(y)−
Vy(x, y),
where the first equality comes from (69) and the last equality comes from (81) and from the
relation Uz(φ(y)− b(y), y) = −Vx(b(y), y) = −1. Thus (79) is satisfied. Moreover,
ν
′′
(y) = −φ′′(y) + b′′(y) + A((φ(y)− b(y))h′′1(y) +B((φ(y)− b(y))h
′′
2(y)
+(φ′(y)− b′(y))A′(φ(y)− b(y))(h′1(y)− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ (φ(y)−b(y))h′2(y))
= −φ′′(y) + b′′(y) + 2rσ
2
(µ2 − y2)2U((φ(y)− b(y), y)
+(φ′(y)− b′(y))Uzy((φ(y)− b(y), y)
= −φ′′(y) + b′′(y) + 2rσ
2
(µ2 − y2)2U((φ(y)− b(y), y)
= b
′′
(y) + lim
x−→b(y)−
Vyy(x, y),
where the last equality comes from (82) and from the relations Uzz(φ(y)−b(y), y) = Uzy(φ(y)−
b(y), y) = 0, Uz(φ(y) − b(y), y) = −1 and Uyy(φ(y) − b(y), y) = 2rσ2(µ2−y2)2U((φ(y) − b(y), y).
Therefore, V is twice differentiable on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
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We show below that the function V has bounded first derivatives Vx and Vy. This amounts
to show that lim
x−→∞
Vx(x, y) < ∞ and lim
y−→µ
Vy(x, y) < ∞. We write the change of variable
x = φ(y)− z in the form y = ψ(x+ z) and define
W (x, z) ≡ V (x, ψ(x+ z)) = U(z, ψ(x+ z)).
We have
Vx(x, y) = Wx(x, φ(y)− x)−Wz(x, φ(y)− x),
Vy(x, y) = φ
′(y)Wz(x, φ(y)− x) = σ
2
µ2 − y2Wz(x, φ(y)− x).
We then deduce that Vx is bounded if and only if
lim
z−→∞
Wx(x, z)−Wz(x, z) <∞. (83)
From (47), we deduce that Vy is bounded if and only if lim
z−→∞
1
ψ′(x+ z)
Wz(x, z) < ∞, or,
equivalently if and only if
lim
z−→∞
1
ψ′(x+ z)
∆′(z) <∞, (84)
where the latter expression follows from a computation that uses (76). Using (74) we obtain
that (84) is equivalent to
lim
z−→∞
1
ψ′(x+ z)
2µ2
σ2y∗
(h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z)) + h
′
2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)))
+
ψ′(z)
ψ′(x+ z)
(h′1(k(z))h
′
2(ψ(z))− h′2(k(z))h′1(ψ(z))) <∞. (85)
Recalling that lim
z−→∞
φ(k(z)) − z = xµ and observing that k(z) = ψ((φ(k(z)) − z), formulae
(44)-(48) lead to the relations
1
ψ′(x+ z)
2µ2
σ2y∗
h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z)) ∼z=∞
µ
y∗
(γ − 1)eβxeγβxµeβz,
1
ψ′(x+ z)
2µ2
σ2y∗
h′2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)) ∼z=∞ −
µ
y∗
γeβxe(1−γ)βxµeβz,
ψ′(z)
ψ′(x+ z)
h′1(k(z))h
′
2(ψ(z)) ∼z=∞ −γ(γ − 1)eβxeγβxµeβz,
ψ′(z)
ψ′(x+ z)
h′2(k(z))h
′
1(ψ(z)) ∼z=∞ −γ(γ − 1)eβxe(1−γ)βxµeβz.
Aggregating these relations in (85), we obtain that
lim
z−→∞
1
ψ′(x+ z)
Wz(x, z) = lim
z−→∞
eβxeβz((γ − 1)2eγβxµ − γ2e(1−γ)βxµ) = 0, (86)
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where the last equality follows from (37). Thus, Vy is bounded. We deduce from (86) that
lim
z−→∞
Wz(x, z) = 0 and from (76) that
Wx(x, z) ∼z=∞ σ
2
4
(
y∗
µ
)2(
1
µ
)2
f ′(x)∆(z).
Since lim
z−→∞
φ(k(z))− z = xµ, we obtain from (77) that (83) is satisfied. Thus Vx is bounded.
Finally, we prove below that
max(LV − rV, 1− Vx) ≤ 0 on [0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
Note that, by construction, V (0, y) = 0 for all y ∈ (−µ, µ) and that LV − rV = 0 on the set
{x ≤ b(y)}. We first show that the mapping x −→ V (x, y) is concave on the set {x < b(y)}.
The change of variable (17) and relation (63) yield that, on the set {x ≤ b(y)},
V (x, y) = A(φ(y)− x)h1(y) +B(φ(y)− x)h2(y).
Using (69), we obtain that
Vxx(x, y) = k
′
(φ(y)− x) y
∗
2µ2
(h
′′
2(k(φ(y)− x)h1(y)− h
′′
1(k(φ(y)− x)h2(y)). (87)
From (45), the right hand side of (87) has the same sign than
k
′
(φ(y)− x) y
∗
2µ2
(h2(k(φ(y)− x)h1(y)− h1(k(φ(y)− x)h2(y)). (88)
Since h1 is positive decreasing and h2 is positive increasing, the function (h2(k(φ(y) −
x)h1(y) − h1(k(φ(y) − x)h2(y)) is positive if and only if k(φ(y) − x) > y. Since k is in-
creasing, this latter inequality is equivalent to φ(y) − x > k−1(y), that is x < b(y). Thus,
(88) is negative since y∗ < 0. Therefore, the mapping x −→ V (x, y) is concave on the set
{x < b(y)}. Because Vx(x, y) = 1 for all x ≥ b(y), we conclude that x −→ V (x, y) is concave
over [0,∞), and in turn that Vx ≥ 1 on [0,∞).
It remains to show that LV − rV < 0 on the set {x > b(y)}. On the set {x > b(y)},
we have that V (x, y) = x − b(y) + ν(y) and Vxy(b(y), y) = 0. We deduce the equalities
Vy(x, y) = Vy(b(y), y) and Vyy(x, y) = Vyy(b(y), y). Therefore, using the fact that V is twice
differentiable across b, we obtain that, on the set {x > b(y)},
(AV − rV )(x, y) = 1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2Vyy(b(y), y) + y − rV (x, y))
= −r(x− b(y))
< 0.
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The proof of Proposition 7 is complete and thus V ≤ V . 2
Finally, we show that the solution V can be reached by an admissible policy. Our guess
is that the optimal cash reserve process is reflected along the free boundary function b on a
horizontal direction in the (x, y)-plane. We formalize this using a 2-dimensional version to
Skorohod’s lemma established by Burdzy and Toby (1995). Specifically, there exists a unique
continuous process {L = (Lt)t; t ≥ 0} defined on (Ω,FR,P) such that, for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω,
• (φ(Yt(ω))− φ(y) + x− Lt(ω), Yt(ω)) ∈ [0, b(y)]× [y∗∗, µ), ∀t ∈ [0, τ0], (89)
where τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |φ(Yt)− φ(y) + x− Lt = 0},
• L0(ω) = 0, and t −→ Lt(ω) is nondecreasing on
{t ≥ 0 : φ(Yt)− φ(y) + x− Lt = b(Yt)}, (90)
• t −→ Lt(ω) is constant on
{t ≥ 0 : (φ(Yt(ω))− φ(y) + x− Lt(ω), Yt(ω)) ∈ (0, b(y))× (y∗∗, µ)}. (91)
Conditions (89)-(91) ensure that the policy L is admissible and that the process
φ(Yt)− φ(y) + x− Lt is reflected in a horizontal direction whenever it hits b(Yt).
Proposition 8 The function V can be attained by an admissible policy and thus V ≤ V .
Proof of Proposition 8 Let us consider the process D = {Dt; t ≥ 0} with
Dt =
(
(x− b(y))+1 y≥y∗∗ + x1 y≤y∗∗
)
1 t=0 + Lt1 t>0, (92)
where L is defined by (89)-(91) and let us consider the continuous process
Xt ≡ φ(Yt)− φ(y) + x−Dt.
A computation based on Itoˆ’s formula yields that, for all t ≥ 0,
E
[
e−rt∧τ0V (Xt∧τ0 , Yt∧τ0)
]
= V (x, y)− E
[∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsVx(Xs, Ys) dDs
]
= V (x, y)− E
[∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs dDs
]
(93)
where the second equality comes from (90) and (91) along with the fact that Vx(b(y), y) = 1.
Letting t go to ∞ in (93) yields
V (x, y) = E
[∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs dDs
]
≤ V .
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2Thus, from Propositions 7 and 8, the function V defined in Proposition 6 coincides with
the value function V of problem (49). Equation (92) provides the optimal dividend policy:
The function b corresponds to the dividend boundary function of the shareholders’ problem
(49). The optimal cash reserve process is reflected along the function b on a horizontal
direction in the (x, y)-plane.
8.3.2 Equity issuance
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1 and to solve problem (8):
V ∗(x, y) = sup
(I,D)∈A
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt(dDt − dIt)
]
.
We proceed as in the previous section where equity issuance was not allowed. The verification
Lemma 2 has to be adapted in the following way.
Lemma 4 (Verification Lemma) Assume there exists a function V defined on [0,∞) ×
(−µ, µ) that satisfies
1. V is twice differentiable almost everywhere,
2. V has bounded first derivatives,
3. max(−V (0, y), Vx(0, y)− p) = 0 for all y ∈ (−µ, µ) and,
max(AV − rV, 1− Vx, Vx − p) ≤ 0 almost everywhere on [0,∞)× (−µ, µ),
then V ≥ V ∗.
Proof of Lemma 4. See the online appendix.
We first assume that the proportional issuance costs p satisfies p ≥ p = V ′µ(0). We prove
that the firm value V ∗ solution to (8) coincides with V solution to (49), so that also the
functions b∗ and b coincide. This proves Theorem 1 when p ≥ p. The result is a direct
consequence of the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 Let us assume that p ≥ p, then p > V x(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ [0,∞)× ∈ (−µ, µ).
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Proof of Lemma 5. See the online appendix.
From Lemma 5, V satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 4. It follows that V ∗(x, y) ≤
V (x, y). On the other hand, considering the policies I∗ = 0 and D∗ defined in (92) lead to
the inequality V ∗(x, y) ≥ V (x, y), thus the result.
The case p ≤ p is much more involved. The analysis relies on the following technical
Proposition.
Proposition 9 The following holds.
(i) Fix zi > z
∗ = φ(y∗), the relation
−h′1(k(z))h2(ψ(z)) + h′2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)) +
2µ2
y∗
p = 0 (94)
uniquely defines over [zi,∞) a continuously differentiable increasing function k > ψ
that satisfies
lim
z−→∞
φ(k(z))− z = xµ, (95)
k(z) ∼
+∞
ψ(z + xµ). (96)
(ii) The equation
p
ψ′(z)
h1(ψ(z)) +
∫ ∞
z
h′1(k(u)) du = 0 (97)
has a unique solution z∗i ∈ (z∗,∞).
(iii) Let us denote y∗i = ψ(z
∗
i ) and let us consider the function k
∗ with
k∗(z) = k1(z)1 z≤z∗i + k2(z)1 z≤z∗i , (98)
where (94) characterizes k2, and where k1 is the solution to the ordinary differential
equation k′1(z) = Θ(k1(z), z) with terminal condition k1(z
∗
i ) = k2(z
∗
i ) where Θ is defined
by (60). Then, k∗ is a well defined continuous increasing function over (z∗,∞) and
continuously differentiable over R \ {z∗i }.
Proof of Proposition 9. See the online appendix. 2
We state now the main result of this section.
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Proposition 10 Let us consider the function k∗ defined by (98) and the function b∗ defined
by the relation
b∗(y) = max(0, b1(y))1 y≤y∗i + b2(y)1 y≥y∗i , (99)
with b2(y) = (φ − k−12 )(y) for any y ≥ y∗i and, b1(y) = (φ − k−11 )(y) for any y ≤ y∗i . The
function b∗ is well defined and positive on [y∗∗, µ) with y∗∗ = b−1(0). It is differentiable
on (y∗∗, µ) \ {yi∗} where yi∗ ≡ k1(z∗i ) = k2(z∗i ). Moreover, let us consider the function
(x, y) −→ V (x, y) defined on R+ × (−µ, µ) by the relations
• For y ∈ [y∗i , µ),
{
V (x, y) = A (φ(y)− x)h1(y) +B (φ(y)− x)h2(y), ∀ 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗(y),
V (x, y) = x− b∗(y) + V (b∗(y), y), ∀x ≥ b∗(y),
where for z > z∗i :  A(z) = A(z∗i ) +
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k
∗(u)) du,
B(z) = B(z∗i )−
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k
∗(u)) du
(100)
and,  A(z∗i ) =
p
ψ′(z∗i )
y∗
2µ2
h2(ψ(z
∗
i )),
B(z∗i ) = − pψ′(z∗i )
y∗
2µ2
h1(ψ(z
∗
i )).
(101)
• For y ∈ (−µ, y∗i ],
V (0, y) = 0, ∀ − µ < y < y,
V (x, y) = A (φ(y)− x)
(
h1(y)− e
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ (φ(y)−x)h2(y)
)
, ∀ 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗(y),
V (x, y) = x− b∗(y) + V (b∗(y), y), ∀x ≥ b∗(y)
where for z ≤ zi,
A(z) =
σ2
4
(
y∗
µ
)2(
1
µ
)2(
h′1(k
∗(z))e−
2
σ2
µ2
y∗ z − h′2(k∗(z))
)
. (102)
Then, the triple (V, y∗i , b
∗) is the unique solution to the system (11)-(16).
Proof of Proposition 10. The proof follows the same route than the proof of Proposition
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6. We first consider a solution (U, zi, k) to the system
1
2σ2
(µ2 − y2)2Uyy(z, y)− rU(z, y) = 0 on {(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)}, (103)
U(z, ψ(z)) = 0 ∀z ≤ zi, (104)
Uz(z, ψ(z)) = −p ∀z ≥ zi, (105)
Uz(z, y) = −1, for k(z) ≤ y, (106)
Uxy(z, k(z)) = 0, (107)
lim
z−→∞
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = Vµ(x). (108)
The relations derived in the proof of Proposition 6 hold true for z ≤ zi, so that the solution
(U, zi, k) satisfies (72), (73) and (75) for z ≤ zi.
Note that (68) and (69) hold true for any (z, y) ∈ {(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)}. We
then deduce from (105) that (94) characterizes the function k on [zi,∞).
Consider (104) and take the derivative with respect to z of U(z, ψ(z)). One get
Uz(z, ψ(z)) + ψ
′(z)Uy(z, ψ(z)) = 0. (109)
Then, using (68) and (105), Equations (104) and (109) evaluated at zi yield{
A(zi) =
p
ψ′(zi)
y∗
2µ2
h2(ψ(zi)),
B(zi) = − pψ′(zi)
y∗
2µ2
h1(ψ(zi)).
(110)
We then obtain from (69) that{
A(z) = A(zi) +
∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u)) du,
B(z) = B(zi)−
∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du.
(111)
Thus, a smooth solution (U, zi, k) to (103)-(107) satisfies U(z, y) = A(z)h1(y) + B(z)h2(y)
on {(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)} and the relations (73), (75), (110), (111). We prove
below that such a smooth solution satisfies (108) if and only if zi = z
∗
i . This will imply that
k = k∗. We have
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = A(z)h1(ψ(x+ z)) +B(z)h2(ψ(x+ z)) (112)
where (70) and (73) define A and B for z ≤ zi and (110) and (111) define A and B for
z ≥ zi. We deduce from (45), (48) and (96) that
h′1(k(u)) ∼
+∞
(γ − 1)eγβ(u+xµ) and h′2(k(u)) ∼
+∞
−γe(1−γ)β(u+xµ). (113)
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It follows that ∫ ∞
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u))du = −∞,
∫ ∞
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u))du <∞, (114)
and also that, ∫ z
zi
h′2(k(u)) du ∼
+∞
∫ z
zi
−γe(1−γ)β(z+xµ) du, (115)
yielding ∫ z
zi
−γe(1−γ)β(u+xµ) du = γ
γ − 1
1
β
e−(γ−1)β(z+xµ)
− γ
γ − 1
1
β
e−(γ−1)β(zi+xµ).
Using (48), we deduce that
lim
z−→∞
∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u))du h1(ψ(x+ z))
=
γ
β(γ − 1)
y∗
µ2
e−(γ−1)βxµe(γ−1)β(x+z) − lim
z−→∞
γ
β(γ − 1)
y∗
µ
e−(γ−1)β(zi+xµ)e(γ−1)β(x+z)
=
γ
β(γ − 1)
y∗
µ2
e−(γ−1)βxµe(γ−1)β(x+z), (116)
where the last equality comes from the fact that γ < 0. We also have,∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du =
∫ ∞
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du−
∫ ∞
z
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du
from which we deduce that,
lim
z−→∞
∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h2(ψ(x+ z)) =
(
limz−→∞
∫ ∞
zi
y∗
µ
h′1(k(u)) du e
−βγ(x+z)
−
∫ ∞
z
y∗
µ
eβγ(u+xµ)(γ − 1) du e−βγ(x+z)
)
.
Thus,
lim
z−→∞
∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h2(ψ(x+ z)) = −
1− γ
βγ
y∗
µ
eβγxµ + lim
z−→∞
e−βγ(x+z)
∫ ∞
zi
y∗
µ
h′1(k(u)) du
(117)
Using (112), (110) and (111) together with (40), (116), (117) we obtain
lim
z−→∞
U(z, ψ(x+ z)) = lim
z−→∞
(∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u)) du h1(ψ(x+ z)) +B(zi)h2(ψ(x+ z))
−
∫ z
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h2(ψ(x+ z))
)
= Vµ(x) + lim
z−→∞
(
B(zi)h2(ψ(x+ z))−
∫ ∞
zi
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du 2µe
−βγ(x+z)
)
= Vµ(x)− lim
z−→∞
(
p
ψ′(zi)
h1(ψ(zi)) +
∫ ∞
zi
h′1(k(u)) du
)
y∗
µ
e−βγ(x+z).
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Since γ < 0, the function U satisfies (108) if and only if zi satisfies (97), or equivalently if
zi = z
∗
i . Therefore, a smooth solution (U, zi, k) to (103)-(108) satisfies U(z, y) = A(z)h1(y)+
B(z)h2(y) on {(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)} and the relations (73), (75), (110), (111) with
k = k∗ (and thus zi = z∗i ). Conversely, a computation shows that U(z, y) = A(z)h1(y) +
B(z)h2(y) on {(z, y), z ∈ R, ψ(z) < y < k(z)} and the relations (73), (75), (110), (111)
with k = k∗ is a solution to the system (103)-(108).
Finally, from Proposition 9, k1 and k2 in (98) are increasing so that, b
∗ in (99) is indeed
a well defined function which is not differentiable at yi∗ from assertion (iii) of Proposition 9.
Then, using the change of variable z = φ(y)−x, we obtain that (V, y∗i , b∗) is a solution to the
system (11)-(16). Observe that the uniqueness of the function V comes from the uniqueness
of the function b∗ that follows from condition (108). 2
Proceeding as in the previous section, we show the following
Proposition 11 The function V defined in Proposition 10 satisfies the assumptions of
Lemma 4 and thus V ≥ V ∗.
Proof of Proposition 11. The proof relies on arguments developed in Proposition 7. We
first show that the function V is C1 on the domain (0,∞)× (−µ, µ) and is C2 on the domain
(0,∞) × (−µ, µ) \ {(b∗(yi∗), yi∗)}. By construction, V is twice continuously differentiable
on any open set in (0,∞) × (−µ, µ) away from the set {(x, y), x = b∗(y)}. Since b∗ is
differentiable on (y∗∗, µ) \ {yi∗}, we can proceed as in the proof of Proposition 7 to prove
that V is of class C2 on [0,∞)× (−µ, µ) \ {(b∗(yi∗), yi∗)}. Also by construction, the study of
the C1-differentiability of V ∗ does not involve the derivative of b∗: to establish that V is C1
on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ), it is sufficient to check that A and B are continuously differentiable at
z∗i . For the continuity of A (or equivalently of B) at z
∗
i , observe that (73) and (94) evaluated
at z∗i , lead to (101). The differentiability of A and B at z
∗
i comes from (69) and (100). Thus,
V is twice differentiable almost everywhere.
Second, let us fix any y ∈ (y∗∗, µ). We deduce from the proof of Proposition 7 that the
mapping x→ V (x, y) is concave on [0,∞) \ {φ(y)− z∗i } if and only if
(k∗)
′
(φ(y)− x)(h2(k∗(φ(y)− x)h1(y)− h1(k∗(φ(y)− x)h2(y)) < 0. (118)
Note that (118) is well defined since φ(y) − x 6= z∗i on the considered domain, such that
the derivative of k∗ is well defined. The reasoning developed in the proof of Proposition 7
shows that (118) holds true. Now, because V is linear in x outside {x < b∗(y)} and that
Vx(b
∗(y), y) = 1 for any y ∈ (−µ, µ), we deduce from the concavity of x → V (x, y) that
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Vx(x, y) ≥ 1 on [0,∞) \ {φ(y)− z∗i }. Then, because V is C1 on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ), one obtains
that Vx(x, y) ≥ 1 on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
Finally, the concavity and C1-differentiability properties together with the fact that
Vx(0, y) ≤ p for any y ∈ (−µ, µ) lead to Vx(x, y) ≤ p on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ).
The arguments developed in the proof of Proposition 7 show that LV − rV ≤ 0 on
(0,∞) × (−µ, µ) \ {(b∗(yi∗), yi∗)}. Aggregating all these results, we obtain that, almost
everywhere on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ),
max(AV − rV, 1− Vx, Vx − p) ≤ 0.
Observe also that V satisfies by construction max(−V (0, y), Vx(0, y) − p) = 0 for all y ∈
(−µ, µ).
To conclude, it remains to show that the function V has bounded first derivatives. We
have Vx(x, y) ≤ p on (0,∞)× (−µ, µ) such that (x, y) −→ Vx(x, y) is bounded over [0,∞)×
(−µ, µ). From the expression of V in Proposition 10, we deduce that Vy is bounded if and
only if
lim
y−→µ
Vy(x, y) <∞.
That is, as shown in Proposition 7, if and only if
lim
z−→∞
1
ψ′(x+ z)
Wz(x, z) <∞
where W (x, z) = V (x, ψ(x+ z)) = U(z, ψ(x+ z)).
We have that
W (x, z) = A(z)h1(ψ(x+ z)) +B(z)h2(ψ(x+ z))
= A(z∗i )h1(ψ(x+ z)) +B(z
∗
i )h2(ψ(x+ z))
+
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u)) du h1(ψ(x+ z))
−
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h2(ψ(x+ z)).
This leads to
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1ψ′(x+ z)
Wz(x, z) = A(z
∗
i )h
′
1(ψ(x+ z)) +B(z
∗
i )h
′
2(ψ(x+ z))
+
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(z))
h1(ψ(x+ z))
ψ′(x+ z)
− y
∗
2µ2
h′1(k(z))
h2(ψ(x+ z))
ψ′(x+ z)
+
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u)) du h
′
1(ψ(x+ z))
−
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h
′
2(ψ(x+ z)),
or, equivalently using (46), (47),
1
ψ′(x+ z)
Wz(x, z) = A(z
∗
i )h
′
1(ψ(x+ z)) +B(z
∗
i )h
′
2(ψ(x+ z))
+
y∗σ2
2µ2
h′2(k(z))
h2(ψ(x+ z))
− y
∗σ2
2µ2
h′1(k(z))
h1(ψ(x+ z))
+
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′2(k(u)) du h
′
1(ψ(x+ z))
−
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h
′
2(ψ(x+ z)). (119)
Using (113), (114), (115) and (48), we have that
h′1(ψ(x+ z)) ∼
+∞
(γ − 1)eγβ(x+z), h′2(ψ(x+ z)) ∼
+∞
−γe(1−γ)β(x+z),
y∗σ2
2µ2
h′2(k(z))
h2(ψ(x+ z))
∼
+∞
− y
∗
2µ2
1
β
γe(1−γ)βxµeγβxeβz,
y∗σ2
2µ2
h′1(k(z))
h1(ψ(x+ z))
∼
+∞
− y
∗
2µ2
1
β
(1−γ)eγβxµe(1−γ)βxeβz,∫ z
z∗i
h′2(k(u))
y∗
2µ2
du h′1(ψ(x+ z)) ∼
+∞
y∗
2µ2
γ
1
β
eγβxe−(γ−1)βxµeβz.
and
lim
z−→∞
∫ z
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h
′
2(ψ(x+ z)) = lim
z−→∞
(∫ ∞
z∗i
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h
′
2(ψ(x+ z))
−
∫ ∞
z
y∗
2µ2
h′1(k(u)) du h
′
2(ψ(x+ z))
)
.
Aggregating all these relations in (119), a last computation shows that proving lim
y−→∞
Vy(x, y) <
∞ is equivalent to prove
lim
z−→∞
(
−B(z∗i ) +
y∗
2µ2
∫ z
z∗i
h′1(k(u)) du
)
γe(1−γ)β(x+z) <∞.
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Noting that β > 0 and using (101), we obtain that lim
y−→∞
Vy(x, y) <∞ if and only if z∗i satisfies
(97), which indeed holds true by definition of z∗i and concludes the proof of Proposition 11,
from which it follows that V ∗ ≤ V . 2
The next proposition establishes the converse inequality
Proposition 12 The function V can be attained by an admissible policy and thus V ≤ V .
Proof of Proposition 12. The proof follows exactly the same arguments than those
developed in Proposition 8. Let Lb
∗
and L0 positive continuous increasing processes such
that the process
φ(Yt)− φ(y) + x− Lb∗t + L0t
is reflected in a horizontal direction whenever Xt = b
∗(Yt) and whenever Xt = 0. Following
the results of Burdzy and Toby (1995), the processes Lb
∗
t and L
0
t are well-defined. Then, the
policies
D∗t =
(
(x− b∗(y))+1 y≥y∗∗ + x1 y≤y∗∗
)
1 t=0 + L
b∗
t 1 t>0,
I∗t = L
0
t1 Yτ0>y∗i 1 t>0,
are admissible and a computation based on Itoˆ’s formula yields
V (x, y) = E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt(dD∗t − dI∗t )
]
which concludes the proof of Proposition 12. 2
Thus, from Propositions 11 and 12, the function V defined in Proposition 10 coincides
with the value function V ∗ of problem (8). The function b∗ corresponds to the dividend
boundary function of the shareholders’ problem (8). The optimal cash reserve process is
reflected along the function b∗ on a horizontal direction in the (x, y)-plane. The threshold
y∗i corresponds to the level of the profitability prospects above which new shares are issued
when cash reserves are depleted.
To conclude the proof of our main Theorem 1, it remains to show the properties of the
dividend boundary function b∗. The next proposition yields these results.
Proposition 13 The function b∗ is increasing for y ≤ yi∗ and decreasing in y for y ≥ yi∗,
where yi∗ = k∗(z∗i ). The function b
∗ attains its maximum at yi∗, b∗(yi∗) > xµ, and y∗∗ >
y∗∗ > y∗.
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Proof of Proposition 13. Given the previous results, we only need to show that b∗ is
increasing over [y∗∗, yi∗], decreasing over [yi∗, µ) and that y∗∗ > y∗∗ > y∗ to prove Proposition
13. First, we show that b∗ is decreasing over [yi∗, µ). Let us introduce the notation b˜(z) ≡
b∗(k∗(z)) = φ(k∗(z)) − z with z > z∗i . Because (k∗)−1 is increasing, we deduce from the
relation b∗(y) = b˜((k∗)−1(y)) that, for any z > z∗i , b˜
′
(z) = (k∗)
′
(z)φ′(k∗(z)) − 1 has the
same sign than b∗
′
(y) for any y > yi∗. In addition, the relation k∗(z) = ψ(b˜(z) + z) leads to
k(∗)
′
(z) = (1 + b˜′(z))ψ′(z + b˜(z)), that is b˜′(z) = k
∗′ (z)
ψ′(z+b˜(z)) − 1. Therefore, to show that b∗ is
decreasing over [yi∗, µ), we prove that k
∗′ (z)
ψ′(z+b˜(z)) −1 > 0 for any z > z∗i . This latter inequality
follows from a computation developed in Lemma 7 in the additional appendix. Then, since
b∗ is decreasing on [yi∗, µ) and b∗(µ) = xµ, we have that b∗(yi∗) > xµ.
It remains to show that b∗ is increasing over [y∗∗, yi∗] and that y∗∗ > y∗∗ > y∗. We obtain
from our previous results that
V (x, y; b∗) = V ∗(x, y) ≥ E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rtdDt
]
= V (x, y; b),
where V (x, y; b∗) is defined in Proposition 10, and V (x, y; b) is defined in Proposition 6.
Equation (92) defines the process D. In particular we have that
V (b∗(y∗∗), y∗∗; b∗) ≥ V (b(y∗∗), y∗∗; b) = V (0, y∗∗; b),
which implies b∗(y∗∗) ≥ b(y∗∗). Let us recall that, for y ≤ yi∗ the functions b∗ and b satisfy
(55) and (57). Then, the non crossing property of ordinary differential equations implies
b∗(y) ≥ b(y), for y ≤ yi∗. It then follows from the proof of Lemma 3 that the function
b∗ is increasing for y ≤ yi∗ and that y∗∗ ≥ y∗∗. The same reasoning than in the proof of
Lemma 3 shows that y∗∗ > y∗. Finally, a computation shows that yi∗ is increasing in the
proportional issuance cost p. Recalling that V (x, y; b∗) = V (x, y; b) for p = p, we then deduce
that y∗∗ > y∗∗ for 1 < p < p. This concludes the proof of Proposition 13. The proof of
Theorem 1 is complete. 2
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 2 follows from a straightforward
adaptation of the proof of Lemma 4 that we show below.
Let us consider a pair of admissible policies D and I and let us write Dt = D
c
t + D
d
t ,
It = I
c
t + I
d
t , where D
c
t (resp. I
c
t ) is the continuous part of Dt (resp. It) and D
d
t (resp. I
d
t )
is the pure discontinuous part of Dt (resp. It). We recall the dynamics of the cash reserve
process and of the profitability prospects process:
dXt = Yt dt+ σdBt − dDt + dIt
p
,
dYt =
µ2 − Y 2t
σ
dBt.
Applying the generalized Itoˆ’s formula to a function V that satisfies the assumptions of
Lemma 4, we can write for τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt = 0},
e−r(t∧τ0)V (Xt∧τ0 , Yt∧τ0) = V (x, y) +
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs (LV (Xs−, Ys)− rV (Xs−, Ys)) ds
+
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsVx(Xs−, Ys)σdBs
+
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsVy(Xs−, Ys)
µ2 − Y 2s
σ
dWs
−
∫ (t∧τ0)
0
e−rsVx(Xs, Ys) dDcs
−
∫ (t∧τ0)
0
e−rsVx(Xs, Ys)
dIcs
p
+
∑
s≤t∧τ0
e−rs(V (Xs, Ys)− V (Xs−, Ys))(1 (∆X)s>0 + 1 (∆X)s<0),
where (∆X)s = Xs−Xs− . By assumption, the second term of the right-hand side is negative
and, because V has bounded first derivatives, the two stochastic integrals are centered square
integrable martingales. Taking expectations and using 1 ≤ Vx ≤ p, we obtain
E
[
e−r(t∧τ0)V (Xt∧τ0 , Yt∧τ0)
] ≤ V (x, y)− E [∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs dDcs
]
+ E
[∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs dIcs
]
+ E
[ ∑
s≤t∧τ0
e−rs(V (Xs, Ys)− V (Xs−, Ys)(1 (∆X)s>0 + 1 (∆X)s<0))
]
.
Observe that there are two types of jumps for the cash reserve process (Xt)t≥0. When there
is a dividend distribution, (∆X)s < 0 so that Xs− −Xs = Ds −Ds− > 0. When there is an
61
issue of shares, (∆X)s > 0 and Xs−Xs− = Is−Is− > 0. Therefore, the Mean-Value theorem
gives the existence of a random variable θ ∈ [Xs, Xs−] when Xs− −Xs = Ds −Ds− > 0 and
a random variable η ∈ [Xs−, Xs] when Xs −Xs− = Is−Is−p > 0 such that:
• on the set {Xs− −Xs = Ds −Ds−}, V (Xs, Ys)− V (Xs−, Ys) = −Vx(θ, Ys)(Xs− −Xs),
• on the set {Xs −Xs− = Is−Is−p }, V (Xs, Ys)− V (Xs−, Ys) = Vx(η, Ys)(Xs −Xs−).
Therefore,
V (Xs, Ys)− V (Xs−, Ys) = (V (Xs, Ys)− V (Xs−, Ys))(1 (∆X)s>0 + 1 (∆X)s<0)
= Vx(η, Ys)(Xs −Xs−)1 (∆X)s>0 − Vx(θ, Ys)(Xs− −Xs)1 (∆X)s<0
= Vx(η, Ys)(
Is − Is−
p
)1 (∆X)s>0 − Vx(θ, Ys)(Ds −Ds−)1 (∆X)s<0
≤ (Is − Is−)1 (∆X)s>0 − (Ds −Ds−)1 (∆X)s<0.
Finally, we obtain
V (x, y) ≥ E [e−r(t∧τ0)V (X(t∧τ0), Y(t∧τ0))]+ E [∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs (dDs − dIs)
]
.
In order to get rid of the first term of the right-hand side, we observe that under the
assumptions of Lemma 4, we have V (x, y) ≤ V (0, y) + px that implies
E
[
e−r(t∧τ0)V (X(t∧τ0), Y(t∧τ0))
] ≤ e−rtVµ(0) + pE[e−rtXt].
Letting t go to ∞ yields
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−r(t∧τ0)V (X(t∧τ0), Y(t∧τ0))
]
= 0,
and thus
V (x, y) ≥ E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rs (dDs − dIs)
]
,
which ends the proof of Lemma 4. 2
Proof of Lemma 3. Observe that the function f defined in (57) does not satisfy the
Lipschitz condition on an open domain containing (x, µ) with x ≥ 0, so that the existence
and uniqueness of a solution to (55), (56) require a specific analysis.
We remark that, the denominator of (57) is strictly positive if and only if x > l1(y) where
l1(y) =
y∗
µ
φ(y
y∗
µ
).
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Thus, f satisfies a local Lipschitz condition with respect to x in D, where D = {(x, y) ∈
R × (−µ, µ) |x > l1(y)}. Thus, for any (x, y), there exists a unique solution gx,y to (55)
defined on a maximal interval I ⊂ (−µ, µ) passing through (x, y).
Second, the numerator of (57) is strictly positive if and only if32 x > l2(y) where,
l2(y) =
y∗
µ
φ
(
yy∗
µ− rσ2(y∗
µ
)2 1
µ
)
.
The function l2 is continuously increasing on [−µ, µ] and satisfies the inequality l2(y) > l1(y)
for any y ∈ (0, µ]. Furthermore, l1(0) = l2(0) = 0 and l1(µ) < l2(µ) = xµ. To see the last
equality, use (37) and remark that 2φ(y∗) = φ( y
∗
1−rσ2( y∗
µ
)2 1
µ2
). This leads to l2(µ) = xµ.
We deduce from the above observations, that any solution g to (55) entering in the do-
main {(x, y) ∈ D | l1(y) < x < l2(y)} remains in this domain. Since l2 is bounded above
by xµ on [−µ, µ], it follows also that any solution g to (55) defined on a maximal interval
I and passing through (x0, y0) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ D |x ≥ xµ} is strictly increasing and satisfies
g(y) > l2(y) for all y ∈ I.
Now, let (yn)n≥0 an increasing sequence converging to µ. For each n ∈ N there exists
a unique solution gxµ,yn to (55) satisfying gn(xµ) = yn. Let us consider the sequence of
functions (gn)n≥0 defined by the relations{
gn(y) = gxµ,yn(y) ∀y ∈ (0, yn],
gn(y) = xµ ∀y ∈ [yn, µ].
Our previous remarks on the solutions to (55) together with a standard non crossing prop-
erty yield that, (gn)n≥0 is a decreasing sequence of increasing functions defined on (0, µ] and
bounded above by xµ. Thus, it admits a pointwise limit g defined on (0, µ]. The function g
is bounded above by xµ and satisfies g(µ) = xµ. We show below that g satisfies (55).
By construction, for each n ∈ N, for any y ∈ (0, µ) one has
gn(y) = xµ −
∫ µ
y
f(gn(s), s) 1 s≤yn ds.
A direct computation shows that, for any fixed y > 0, the mapping x −→ f(x, y) is contin-
uously increasing over {x |x ≥ l2(y)}. We deduce that, for any y ∈ (0, µ),∫ µ
y
lim
n−→∞
f(gn(s), s) 1 s≤yn ds =
∫ µ
y
f(g(s), s) ds ≤
∫ µ
y
f(xµ, s) ds <∞,
32Note that, the definition of y∗ in (33) implies that µ− rσ2(y∗µ )2 1µ = µ(1− rσ2 1µ2+2rσ2 ) > 0.
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where the last inequality comes from the fact that the mapping s −→ f(xµ, s) is continu-
ous over (0, µ) with lims−→µ f(xµ, s) = 12
1−rσ2( y∗
µ
)2 1
µ2
r( y
∗
µ
)2
< ∞. It results from the dominated
convergence Theorem that,
g(y) = xµ −
∫ µ
y
f(g(s), s) ds. (120)
Thus, g is defined and increasing on (0, µ], satisfies the ode (55)-(56). A standard extension
argument ensures that g is defined on a maximal interval I ⊂ (−µ, µ) as well.
We show that y∗∗ ≡ g−1(0) is well defined and satisfies y∗∗ > y∗. Take the solution g0,y∗
to (55) defined on a maximal interval I ⊂ (−µ, µ) passing through (0, y∗). A computation
shows that the function v1(y) =
y∗
µ
(φ(y∗) − φ(y)) defined on (−µ, µ) satisfies v1(y∗) =
g0,y∗(y
∗) = 0 together with the inequality v′1(y) < f(v1(y), y) for any y ∈ (−µ, 0]. We deduce
that g0,y∗(y) > v1(y) for all y ∈ (y∗, 0]. From the Cauchy-Lipschitz Theorem it follows that
g0,y∗ > gv1(0),0 on a maximal interval, where gv1(0),0 is the solution to (55) passing through
(v1(0), 0).
Now, let us consider the function v2(y) =
y∗
µ
(φ(y y
∗
µ
) + φ(y∗)) ≥ l2(y) on [0, µ]. Compu-
tations shows that v2(0) = v1(0), v2(µ) = xµ and v
′
2(y) ≤ f(v2(y), y) for any y ∈ [0, µ]. We
deduce that g0,y∗(y) ≥ v2(y) for any y ∈ [0, µ]. It follows that g0,y∗ > gv1(0),0 ≥ g which
implies that y∗∗ ≡ g−1(0) > y∗.
Finally, we show that g is the unique solution to g′(y) = f(g(y), y) satisfying the boundary
condition g(µ) = xµ. Suppose the contrary, let g and g˜ be two solutions to (55) with
g(µ) = g˜(µ) = xµ and g˜(y) > g˜(y) over (0, µ). The functions g and g˜ satisfy (120). It follows
that,
g˜(y)− g(y) =
∫ µ
y
f(g(s), s)− f(g˜(s), s) ds. (121)
The right hand side of (121) is strictly positive whereas its left hand side is negative because
the mapping x −→ f(x, y) is increasing for any fixed y > 0, thus, a contradiction.
We now turn to the study of the function k = (φ − b)−1 : [φ(y∗∗),∞) −→ [y∗∗, µ). We
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observe that
φ′(y)− g′(y) = σ
2
µ2 − y2
1− yy
∗ −
(
µ− rσ2
(
y∗
µ
)2
1
µ
)
ψ
(
µ
y∗ g(y)
)
yy∗ − µψ
(
µ
y∗ g(y)
)

=
σ2
µ2 − y2
1
µ
rσ2(y
∗
µ
)2ψ
(
µ
y∗ g(y)
)
−yy∗ + µψ
(
µ
y∗ x
)
is positive for g(y) > max(0, y
∗
µ
φ(g(y)y
∗
µ
), so that φ−b is strictly increasing over [y∗∗, µ) where
b = max(0, g) with g satisfying (55) and (57). Thus, k = (φ− b)−1 : [φ(y∗∗),∞) −→ [y∗∗, µ)
is well defined, increasing and satisfies
k
′
(z) =
1
(φ− b)′(k(z))
=
µ3
y∗rσ2
µ2 − k(z)2
σ2
ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(k(z))− z)
)
µ− yy∗
y∗ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(k(z))− z)
) .
Because b > 0 and k = (φ− b)−1 we have that φ(k(z))− z > 0. Because b(y) > y∗
µ
φ(b(y)y
∗
µ
we have that ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(k(z))− z)
)
µ − yy∗ > 0, so that (z, k(z)) ∈ D˜ = {(z, y) ∈ R ×
(−µ, µ) |φ(y) − z > max(0, y∗
µ
φ(y y
∗
µ
))}. Finally, the relation k = (φ − b)−1 together with
lim
y−→µ
b(y) = b(µ) = xµ < ∞ implies that lim
y−→µ
k
−1
(y) = ∞ and in turn that lim
z−→∞
k(z) = ∞
since k is increasing. Then, posing y = k(z), the relation b(y) = φ(y) − k−1(y) leads to
lim
z−→∞
b(k(z)) = φ(k(z))− z = xµ.
Conversely, let us consider a C1-function k solution to the ordinary differential equation
(58), (59) on the domain D˜. The function k is increasing so that, b = φ− k−1 is well defined
over (y∗∗, µ). It is positive since by assumption (z, k(z)) ∈ D˜. A direct computation shows
that b satisfies the ordinary differential equation (58), (59) on the domain D. Thus, we
obtain that b = b and in turn k = k. The proof of Lemma 3 is complete. 2
Proof of Lemma 5. Since for any y fixed in (−µ, µ), the mapping x −→ V x(x, y) is
concave on [0,∞), we only have to check that V x(0, y) < p for any y ∈ (−µ, µ). Not-
ing that V
′
µ(0) = p and that lim
y−→µ
V x(0, y) = V
′
µ(0), the result follows from the fact
that the mapping y −→ V x(0, y) is increasing.33 To see that latter point, note that
V (x, y) = U(φ(y) − x, y) where the function U is defined in the proof of Proposition 6.
33A computation based on (76) and (78) yields lim
y−→µV x(0, y) = V
′
µ(0).
65
We obtain that V x(0, y) = −Uz(0, φ(y)) and thus that ddyV x(0, y) = −φ′(y)Uzz(0, φ(y)). The
result follows since φ is increasing and Uzz(z, y) =
y∗
2µ2
k
′
(z)(h
′′
2(k(z))h1(y) − h′′1(k(z))h2(y))
which we know to be negative from the proof of the concavity of the mapping x −→ V (x, y)
in Proposition 7. 2
Proof of Proposition 9.
Proof of Assertion (i). From (44), (45) and (46) the mapping
y −→ G(z, y) = −h′1(y)h2(ψ(z)) + h′2(y)h1(ψ(z)) +
2µ2
y∗
p
is well defined over [ψ(z),∞), increasing and satisfies the equality G(ψ(z), z) = 2µ2
y∗ (p−1) < 0
and lim
y−→µ
G(z, y) = +∞. Thus, the function k is well defined over [zi,∞) and satisfies the
inequality k > ψ. Applying the implicit function Theorem, we deduce from the relation
G(z, k(z)) = 0 that, the function k is differentiable and satisfies for any z > zi
k′(z) = ψ′(z)
h′2(k(z))h
′
1(ψ(z))− h′1(k(z))h′2(ψ(z))
h
′′
1(k(z))h2(ψ(z))− h′′2(k(z)h1(ψ(z))
. (122)
We saw in the proof of Proposition 7 that the denominator of the right hand side of (122)
is negative. The numerator of k′ in (122) is also negative. To see this point, remark that
x −→ h′2(x)h′1(y) − h′1(x)h′2(y) is decreasing over [y, µ) since it takes the value 0 at x = y,
and its derivative has the same sign as h2(x)h
′
1(y) − h1(x)h′2(y) < 0. Thus, k is increasing
over [zi,∞). Then, assertion (i) of Propostion 9 follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 6 the following holds
(i) ψ(z + xµ) < k(z) ∀z,
(ii) ψ(z + xµ + ) > k(z) ∀ > 0 for z sufficiently large.
Proof of Lemma 6. We show that, for any z, G(z, ψ(xµ + z)) < 0 and that, for any  > 0
and any z sufficiently large, G(z, ψ(xµ + z + )) > 0. Using (44), (45), (48), computations
yield, for x ≥ 0
G(z, ψ(x+ z)) = g1(x) + e
−βzg2(x),
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with
g1(x) = (−µ
2
y∗
+ µ)eβγx − (µ
2
y∗
+ µ)e−(γ−1)βx + p
2µ2
y∗
,
= 2(1− γ)µeβγx − 2γµe−(γ−1)βx + p2µ
2
y∗
.
g2(x) = (−µ
2
y∗
+ µ)e−βγx − (µ
2
y∗
+ µ)e(γ−1)βx + p
2µ2
y∗
= 2(1− γ)µe−βγx − 2γµe(γ−1)βx + p2µ
2
y∗
. (123)
To prove (i) and (ii), we show that the functions g1 and g2 are increasing and satisfiy
g2(xµ) < g1(xµ) = 0. A computation leads to
g′1(x) > 0⇔ e(1−2γ)βx > 1, and g′2(x) > 0⇔ e−(1−2γ)βx < 1.
Both inequalities hold true since (1 − 2γ)β > 0. The relation g1(xµ) = 0 follows from the
definition of xµ. Finally, using (123) and (41) and rearrangging terms yield that
g2(xµ) < 0⇔ g(xµ) > g(xµ) (124)
with g(x) = (1 − γ)(eγβx − e−βγx) and g(x) = γ(e(1−γ)βx − e(γ−1)βx). It is easy to see that
g(0) = g(0) = 0 and that g and g are decreasing. To prove (124), we remark that, for any
x > 0, g′(x) > g′(x). Indeed, this latter inequality is equivalent to
eγβx + e−βγx < eβ(γ−1)x + eβ(1−γ)x,
which, given that −βγ < β(1− γ), follows the properties of the function cosh. 2
Thus, from (i) and (ii) we have that,
∀ > 0, ∃z, ∀z ≥ z, ψ(z + xµ) < k(z) < ψ(z + xµ + ).
Assertions (95) and (96) follow by noting that, k(z) = ψ((φ(k(z))− z) + z) and that ψ is a
bounded continuous and increasing function. The proof of assertion (i) is complete.
Proof of Assertion (ii). We start with the existence of a solution z∗i to equation (97). Let
us consider
f(z) =
p
ψ′(z)
h1(ψ(z)) +
∫ ∞
z
h′1(k(u)) du. (125)
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To begin, we show that f(z∗i ) > 0 and that lim
z−→∞
f(z) < 0. Since function h′1 is negative
and increasing, we deduce from the inequality ψ < k that∫ ∞
z∗i
h′1(ψ(u)) du <
∫ ∞
z∗i
h′1(k(u)) du. (126)
Thus, to show that f(z∗i ) > 0, we show that
p
ψ′(z∗i )
h1(ψ(z
∗)) +
∫ ∞
z∗i
h′1(ψ(u)) du > 0.
Computations are explicit and yield that (126) is equivalent to
p(1 + e−βz
∗
i )− γ
γ − 1e
−βz∗i +
1− γ
γ
> 0. (127)
An easy computation shows that the left hand side of (127) is equal to zero when p = 1.
This implies that f(z∗i ) > 0 for p > 1. We already know that k = ψ when p = 1. We thus
obtained as a by product result that z∗i = z
∗ when p = 1.
We show that lim
z−→∞
f(z) = 0−. From (48) and (96), it is sufficient to show that,
p
β
eβγz(1 + e−βz) +
∫ ∞
z
h′1(ψ(u+ xµ)) du < 0
⇔ p(1 + e−βz) < 1− γ−γ e
βγxµ .
This latter inequality follows from (43), thus the result. Therefore, there exists z∗i such that
f(z∗i ) = 0.
Uniqueness of z∗i . A direct computation shows that f
′(z) < 0 for z < 0 . Therefore, given
that lim
z−→∞
f(z) < 0, if f has more than one zero, there exists z1 and z2 such that 0 < z1 < z2,
f(z1) = f(z2) = 0 and f
′(z1) > 0 and f ′(z2) < 0. We reason by way of contradiction and
prove that if there are z1 and z2 such that 0 < z1 < z2, f(z1) = f(z2) = 0 and f
′(z1) > 0
then f ′(z2) > 0 which contradicts lim
z−→∞
f(z) < 0.
We consider below g(z) = f(z)h2(ψ(z)) that as the same zeros and the same sign than
f . From (46) and (47), we have that
g(z) = pσ2 +
∫ ∞
z
h′1(k(u)) du h2(ψ(u)).
Thus,
g′(z) = ψ′(z)h′2(ψ(z))
∫ ∞
z
h′1(k(u)) du− h2(ψ(z))h′1(k(z))
= ψ′(z)h′2(ψ(z))
∫ ∞
z
h′1(k(u)) du− p
2µ2
y∗
− h1(ψ(z))h′2(k(z)),
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where the last equality follows from (94).
Now, z1 satisfies by assumption g(z1) = 0 and g
′(z1) > 0, thus
g′(z1) = ψ′(z1)h′2(ψ(z1))(−
p
ψ′(z1)
h1(ψ(z1))− p2µ
2
y∗
− h1(ψ(z1))h′2(k(z1)) (128)
= −ph′2(ψ(z1))h1(ψ(z1))− p
2µ2
y∗
− h1(ψ(z1))h′2(k(z1)) > 0,
where the first term of the right hand side of (128) follows from (125). Any zero z of g
satisfies
g′(z) = −ph′2(ψ(z))h1(ψ(z))− p
2µ2
y∗
− h1(ψ(z))h′2(k(z)).
We show that
q1 : z −→ −h′2(ψ(z))h1(ψ(z)),
and
q2 : z −→ −h1(ψ(z))h′2(k(z))
are increasing functions which will imply that g′(z2) > 0. We have
sign{q′1(z))} = sign{−2rσ2 − (
µ2
y∗
− ψ(z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z))},
and
−2rσ2 − (µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z)) = µ2 − ψ2(z) > 0.
Also, we have
q′2(z) = −k′(z)h
′′
2(k(z))h1(ψ(z))− h′1(ψ(z))ψ′(z)h′2(k(z)).
It follows that
q′2(z) ≥ 0⇔ k′(z)
2rσ2
µ2 − k(z)2 < ψ
′(z)
h′1(ψ(z))h2(k(z))(−µ
2
y∗ − k(z))
−h2(k(z))h1(ψ(z)) . (129)
Using (122), a computation yields that
k′(z)
2rσ2
µ2 − k(z)2 = ψ
′(z)
h′1(ψ(z))h2(k(z))(−µ
2
y∗ − k(z))− h1(k(z))h′2(ψ(z))(µ
2
y∗ − k(z))
h1(k(z))h2(ψ(z))− h2(k(z))h1(ψ(z) .
(130)
Using (129) and (130), a computation shows that q′2(z) ≥ 0 is equivalent to ψ(z) < k(z),
which we know to be true, thus the result.
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Proof of Assertion (iii). Given assertion (i), we only need to prove that the solution k1
to the ordinary differential equation
k′1(z) = Θ(z, k1(z)),
k1(z
∗
i ) = k2(z
∗
i ),
with
Θ(z, y) =
µ3
y∗rσ2
µ2 − y2
σ2
ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(y)− z)
)
µ− yy∗
y∗ψ
(
µ
y∗ (φ(y)− z)
)
defined on the domain D˜ = {(z, y) ∈ R × (−µ, µ) |φ(y) − z > max(0, y∗
µ
φ(y y
∗
µ
))}, is a well
defined continuously differentiable and increasing function over (−∞, z∗i ).
We deduce from the proof of Lemma 3 that the ode
k′(z) = Θ(z, k(z)),
k(zi) = yi,
where the couple (zi, yi) satisfies
φ(yi)− zi > max(0, y
∗
µ
φ(yi
y∗
µ
)) (131)
has a unique solution that is continuously differentiable and increasing over (−∞, zi). To
establish Assertion (iii), it thus remain to show that the couple (z∗i , k2(z
∗
i )) satisfies (131).
We deduce from (74) and (75) that this requirement is equivalent to
h′1(k2(z
∗
i ))h2(ψ(z
∗
i )) + h
′
2(k2(z
∗
i ))h1(ψ(z
∗
i )) > 0. (132)
Consider first the case z∗i ≤ 0. Let us recall that the mapping y −→ h′1(y)h2(ψ(z)) +
h′2(y)h1(ψ(z)) is increasing and that k2 > ψ. It follows that
h′1(k2(z
∗
i ))h2(ψ(z
∗
i )) + h
′
2(k2(z
∗
i ))h1(ψ(z
∗
i ))
> h′1(ψ(z
∗
i ))h2(ψ(z
∗
i )) + h
′
2(ψ(z
∗
i ))h1(ψ(z
∗
i )) = −2ψ(z∗i ) ≥ 0.
Thus, (132) is satisfied. Next, consider that z∗i > 0. The function k2 satisfies (94). It follows
that (132) is equivalent to h′2(k2(z
∗
i ))h1(ψ(z
∗
i )) +
µ2
y∗ p > 0. From the proof of assertion (ii) we
know that z∗i satisfies
34
−ph′2(ψ(z∗i ))h1(ψ(z∗i ))− p
2µ2
y∗
− h1(ψ(z∗i ))h′2(k(z∗i )) < 0.
34See the argument underlying Equation (128).
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that is
p
µ2
y∗
+ h1(ψ(z
∗
i ))h
′
2(k(z
∗
i )) > −ph′2(ψ(z∗i ))h1(ψ(z∗i ))− p
µ2
y∗
.
Then, a direct computation shows that
−ph′2(ψ(z∗i ))h1(ψ(z∗i ))− p
µ2
y∗
> 0
if and only if ψ(z∗i ) > 0 which is true since we consider z
∗
i > 0. As a final remark, an easy
computation based on (74) and (122) yields that k′1(z) 6= k′2(z) so that k∗ is not differentiable
at {z∗i }. The proof of assertion (iii) is complete. 2
The next Lemma completes the proof of Proposition 13.
Lemma 7 The following holds
k∗
′
(z)
ψ′(z + b˜(z))
− 1 > 0 for any z > z∗i .
Proof of Lemma 7. From Proposition 9 and Proposition 12, we deduce that k∗ satisfies
(122). Therefore, to prove Lemma 7, we show that
ψ′(z)
ψ′(z + x)
h′2(ψ(z + x))h
′
1(ψ(z))− h′1(ψ(z + x))h′2(ψ(z))
h
′′
1(ψ(z + x))h2(ψ(z))− h′′2(ψ(z + x))h1(ψ(z))
− 1 < 0.
To prove the latter inequality, it is enough to prove
ψ′(z)(h′2(ψ(z + x))h
′
1(ψ(z))− h′1(ψ(z + x))h′2(ψ(z)))
−ψ′(z + x)(h′′1(ψ(z + x)h2(ψ(z))− h
′′
2(ψ(z + x))h1(ψ(z))) > 0
or equivalently,
ψ′(z)(h1(ψ(z + x))h2(ψ(z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(x+ z))(µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z))
−h2(ψ(z + x))h1(ψ(z))(µ
2
y∗
− ψ(x+ z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z)))
− ψ
′(z + x)2σ2r
(µ2 − ψ2(x+ z))2 (h1(ψ(z + x))h2(ψ(z))− h2(ψ(z + x))h1(ψ(z)) > 0.
This latter expression is equivalent to
h1(ψ(z + x))h2(ψ(z))
(
ψ′(z)(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(x+ z))(µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z))− 2r
h1(ψ(x+ z))h2(ψ(x+ z))
)
+
h2(ψ(z + x))h1(ψ(z))
(
ψ′(z)(−µ
2
y∗
+ ψ(x+ z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z)) + 2r
h1(ψ(x+ z))h2(ψ(x+ z))
)
> 0.
(133)
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We remark that(
ψ′(z)(−µ
2
y∗
+ ψ(x+ z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z)) + 2r
h1(ψ(x+ z))h2(ψ(x+ z))
)
> 0, (134)
and
h2(ψ(z + x))h1(ψ(z)) > h1(ψ(z + x))h2(ψ(z)). (135)
A straightforward computation shows that the sign of
ψ′(z)(−µ
2
y∗
+ ψ(x+ z))(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z)) + 2r
h1(ψ(x+ z))h2(ψ(x+ z))
+ψ′(z)(−µ
2
y∗
− ψ(x+ z))(µ
2
y∗
− ψ(z))− 2r
h1(ψ(x+ z))h2(ψ(x+ z))
is the same as the sign of −ψ(z)+ψ(x+z). But clearly, −ψ(z)+ψ(x+z) is positive. It then
follows from (133), (134) and (135) that the mapping y −→ b∗(y) is decreasing over [yi∗, µ).
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